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Haul down the bridge, Sir Consul, 
 With all the speed ye may; 
 I, with two more to help me, 
 Will hold the foe in play. 
 In yon strait path a thousand 
 May well be stopped by three. 
 Now who will stand on either hand, 
 And keep the bridge with me? 
 –Lays of Ancient Rome 
This dissertation was truly a collaborative effort and is richer because of the support and 
encouragement of many. I thank all those who stood on either hand along the way, but especially 
Marilyn Krogh, who generously gave her time to support my many aspirations for this project. 
As the saying goes – no less true here than in life – any remaining errors are mine alone. 
 
 
For Lauren Potthoff and Jill Saponaro. 
Things written remain. 
—Aaron Burr  
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 Understanding the ways in which organizations fail is foundational to the organization 
studies discipline. Organizational sociologists have outlined the various ways organizations and 
organizational cultures can fail separately or simultaneously, temporarily or totally. Yet, little 
effort has been directed toward proving that organizational culture is capable of surviving the 
complete and total collapse of the organization from which it emerged. This work uncovers a 
new way that organizations can fail that leaves their organizational culture intact. The author 
considers employee interactions during the Lehman Brothers bankruptcy by reassembling the 
cultural artifacts contained in a company email archive to demonstrate that organizational culture 
is less rigid and more resilient and unpredictable than previously thought. By centering 
organizationally situated interactions between employees at the meso-level, the author 
demonstrates how extra-local institutional logics can generate consensus, cohesion, and 
confusion during periods of organizational turmoil, when those logics are dynamically 
reimagined as endogenous to the organization by employees with disparate personal histories 
across distinct organizational positions, who embrace them, combine them, challenge them, and 







What led to the ’08 crisis? First, there’s the buildup of the U.S. bull-market 
mentality. Now, I’m going to try to run through these quickly. It’s not just one 
single thing. All these things taken together – I refer to it as the perfect storm. But 
it starts with the government. They wanted everybody to be able to fulfill their 
view of the American dream. We had low rates, easy access to credit. That led to 
increased home values, household debt, people borrowed a record amount of 
money, and as rates went down further, people refinanced, they used their homes 
and the increased value in their homes as ATM accounts… 
Lehman was not a bankrupt company. The information coming out now is 
speaking to that. Did we try to do everything we possibly could? Yes. Did we fall 
prey to other agendas? I'll leave it at that… The real success for the firm, the real 
success for Lehman Brothers in my view, and the key differentiator, was our 
culture. 
Former Lehman Brothers CEO, Dick Fuld 
Opening Statement to Marcum MicroCap 
May 28th, 2015 
 
On Monday, September 15th, 2008 Lehman Brothers filed for bankruptcy. As the biggest 
bankruptcy protection claim in history, Lehman Brothers’ surpassed the next largest filing by 
over half a trillion dollars.1  The immediate aftermath of Lehman’s bankruptcy was marked by a 
broad market downturn and the collapse of investor confidence.2  As the public searched for a 
scapegoat, Lehman Brother’s executives found themselves mired in controversy. They were 
called to Capitol Hill to account for recent multi-million dollar employee bonus payments made 
only months before the company failed.3 Others condemned government inaction and a failure
																																								 																				
1 Mamudi, Sam. 2008. “Lehman folds with record $613 billion in debt,” Market Watch, September 15. 
2 Berenson, Alex. 2008. “Wall St.’s Turmoil Sends Stocks Reeling,” New York Times, September 15. 
3 Swaine, Jon. 2008. “Richard Fuld punched in face in Lehman Brothers gym,” The Daily Telegraph, October 7. 
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to properly regulate the banking industry following Gramm-Leach-Bliley.4  Firms connected 
with Lehman were likewise unable to escape rising public enmity, as Lehman’s auditors became 
the subject of lawsuits alleging financial malfeasance.5  The federal government moved quickly 
to restore public confidence and stem the tide of bank failures after Lehman’s disintegration by 
authorizing the Troubled Asset Relief Program (TARP)6, a $700 billion public bailout of the 
financial sector, which provoked populist protests, culminating in the Tea Party and Occupy 
Wall Street movements on the political right and left, respectively.7  As the consequences of 
Lehman’s failure rippled across the globe, most could only wonder, “What was going on at 
Lehman Brothers?” 
 Countless Lehman Brothers postmortems have appeared in popular film and print media 
since the bankruptcy. Some implicate the greed and narcissism of individual executives in the 
firm’s failure8, while others condemn government regulators for failing to limit the worst of Wall 
Street’s excesses.9 Still more argue that the collapse of Lehman Brothers was brought on by the 
structural interdependencies of the financial sector itself.10 Few, however, have investigated the 
role of culture in Lehman’s demise, which is all the more surprising given former CEO Dick 
Fuld’s convictions that Lehman’s key differentiator was its culture. This reveals the extent to 
																																								 																				
4 McDonald, Lawrence and Patrick Robinson. 2009. A Colossal Failure of Common Sense: The Inside Story of the 
Collapse of Lehman Brothers. New York: Random House. 
5 Reed, Kevin. 2010. “E&Y sued over Lehmans audit,” AccountancyAge, December 21. 
6 Herszenhorn, David. 2008. “Bailout Plan Wins Approval; Democrats Vow Tighter Rules,” New York Times, 
October 3. 
7 Nocera, Joe. 2012. “Two Days in September,” New York Times, September 14. 
8 McDonald, Lawrence and Patrick Robinson. 2009. A Colossal Failure of Common Sense: The Inside Story of the 
Collapse of Lehman Brothers. New York: Random House. 
9 Sorkin, Andrew Ross. 2009. Too Big to Fail. New York: Random House. 
10 Williams, Mark. 2010. Uncontrolled Risk: The Lessons of Lehman Brothers and How Systemic Risk Can Still 
Bring Down The World Financial System. New York: McGraw-Hill. 
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which our current understanding of organizational culture during periods of organizational 
failure remains incomplete. Seeking to satisfy this need, this project examines the case of 
Lehman Brothers to consider how an organizational culture that celebrates merit and extols the 
talent and ability of its employees explains and accommodates for organizational failure. This 
research analyzes a database of emails written by Lehman Brothers employees in the months 
leading up to and immediately following the bankruptcy to interrogate the sense making 
strategies used by those within the firm during this period. In doing so, this research contributes 
to both the recently resurgent field of organizational culture and the nascent sociology of markets 
by providing an example of how organizational culture can overcome organizational crisis and 
survive despite the permanent and total failure of the organization from which it originally 
emerged. The paper achieves a further contribution by illustrating how the meanings systems 
associated with the free-market mentality can frustrate understandings of failure during periods 
of organizational crisis. 
Literature Review 
Culture is a system under which beliefs, rules, and assumptions are organized in ways 
that sometimes align, conflict, or are ambiguous and unexpected, but that enables people to do 
things together by linking the meanings of their actions and interactions in such a way that they 
can be read, interpreted, and understood by others (Martin 2002, Meyerson 1991, Mills 1988). 
Importantly, “culture does not necessarily imply a uniformity of values,” but rather a common 
frame of reference through which people “may array themselves differently with respect to an 
issue, but whether positively or negatively, they are all oriented to it,” (Feldman 1991: 154). 
Therefore, under this definition, organizational culture fails only when it ceases to meaningfully 
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order an organization’s practices in such a way that members are able to orient themselves to an 
event, issue, or change, irrespective of if that orientation entails acceptance, resistance, or 
indifference. Though they often coincide, it is possible for organizational failure and cultural 
failure to occur independently, such that an organization’s culture might fail while the 
organization itself does not. Moreover, organizational failure does not require that an 
organization cease to exist. An organization fails when it is unable to meet its officially stated 
objectives (Meyer and Zucker 1989) or achieve a goal that is normally expected (Clarke and 
Perrow 1996). Organizational failure is not necessarily permanent or total. Failure, as thus 
defined, can be temporary, with the organization prevailing after some momentary crisis. 
Similarly, when cultures fail they do so in discrete and unpredictable ways. Sometimes an 
organization and its culture fail simultaneously. Other times an organization’s culture fails and is 
replaced by a new emergent culture, as the organization overcomes some threat or crisis. On 
other occasions an organizational culture will not fail entirely, but instead split into multiple 
idiocultures that foreground certain aspects of the old culture while disregarding, replacing, or 
altering others. Figure 1 catalogs the multiple ways organizations and organizational culture can 
fail (or not) and offers illustrative examples of each type. 
Previous scholarship documents the various ways organizational failure and the failure of 
organizational culture can occur (or not) either separately or synchronously in different instances. 
Traditional business school cases conceptualize culture as a means of organizational control. 
Managers direct workplace culture more or less monolithically, manipulating it to overcome 




Figure 1. Organizational Failures and Organizational Cultural Outcomes 
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organizational norms and policies. In these situations, the organization experiences a failure 
during which old beliefs and values are abandoned as obsolete and new ones, which are more 
suitable for making sense of and meeting the contingencies of the crisis, emerge to replace them. 
A classic example of this appears in Kotter and Heskett’s (1992) case study of Nissan. In 1981, 
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Nissan introduced the Nissan Stanza, their first front-wheel drive automobile. It was designed to 
have broad international appeal and was expected to be the first Nissan model that would 
compete directly with American and European manufacturers. After disappointing initial sales, 
the Stanza was subsequently recalled due to suspension flaws that made it unsuitable for 
American highways. Following this embarrassment, Nissan CEO Takashi Ishihara resigned and 
was replaced by Yutaka Kume, who sought to unshackle engineers’ creativity from the inwardly 
focused, regulation-obsessed autocratic culture that existed at Nissan. Kume introduced flexible 
work schedules, eliminated company uniforms, and gave engineers final say over the design of 
new models. Nissan’s engineers largely embraced this newly established independence and the 
allure of work group autonomy attracted a younger generation of engineers to Nissan. The result 
was a new culture of employee empowerment and youthful energy, which helped Nissan 
overtake Honda in domestic automobile sales by the end of the decade. 
Other scholars, however, take a less instrumental approach to culture and organizational 
failure. Weick (1993) considers the deaths of thirteen backcountry firefighters during the Mann 
Gulch Fire to provide an example of an organizational failure during which organizational 
culture also failed and new norms and values did not emerge. Instead, the inability of the 
firefighters to orient themselves to the unfolding crisis ended in a complete collapse of sense 
making, role structure disintegration, and ultimately the demise of the group. Fine and Hallett 
(2014) take up the case of the National Weather Service’s mishandling of the deadly Plainfield 
Tornado to show how an organizational failure can engender, expose, or compound divisions 
between small group cultures within an organization. The failure to provide advanced warning of 
the devastating tornado became a point of differentiation between the National Weather 
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Service’s Chicago and Flowerland offices. Flowerland, a new office created as a result of the 
agency’s restructuring, developed an idioculture that emphasized collective accountability, while 
the Chicago idioculture was grounded in the individual autonomy of its forecasters. The failure 
of accounting giant Arthur Andersen reveals how distinct internal idiocultures compete for 
legitimacy and organizational control (Hallett 2003). Hallett (2003) characterizes Arthur 
Andersen’s cultural turmoil as a conflict between “Samurai” and “Merchant” group cultures. 
While the Samurai culture was engrossed in fidelity to established accounting practices, the 
Merchant culture was consumed with generating ever-greater revenue. Neither group proved 
capable of withstanding the failure on its own. Some “merchants” broke with the “samurai” to 
establish their own separate company and the remaining “merchants” pushed Arthur Andersen’s 
“samurai” into riskier relationships with Enron and Worldcom. Vaughan (1996) uses the 
Challenger Launch Disaster to outline a case in which organizational culture survives an 
organizational failure. Following the explosion of the Space Shuttle, NASA blamed the incident 
on the “amoral calculations” of the project’s managers and fired or reassigned those involved. 
NASA’s data-obsessed procedural culture of production that normalized technical deviance and 
incentivized calculated risk-taking, however, was allowed to endure unchanged. As a result, 
Vaughan predicted a high likelihood that the tragedy would be repeated, which was eventually 
borne out several years later when the Space Shuttle Columbia burst apart upon reentry. 
Notwithstanding previous scholars’ robust and fastidious analyses of cultural and 
organizational failures, little attention has been directed toward the ways in which organizational 
culture might survive despite the total failure and dissolution of an organization. Filling out our 
understanding of this final remaining category would allow us to complete the typology in the 
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table above and augment the existing organization studies literature. While it is theoretically 
possible for an organizational culture to persist in the absence of the organization from which it 
emerged, demonstrating how exactly this comes about has proven to be an elusive contribution 
to the literature. Culture is only discernible through its patterns of manifestation (Martin et. al. 
2006). For the social scientist, studying culture is challenging enough when the organization can 
be observed and data gathered in real time, but is made even more difficult when the original site 
of these manifestations no longer exists. Patterns and configurations of organizational culture 
become detectable when members interact to interpret their world (Martin et. al. 2006, Schein 
1985, Schall 1983). Culture is enacted in interactions and, thus, revealed when people do things 
together (Fine and Hallett 2014, Hallett 2003). “To really understand a culture and to ascertain 
more completely the group’s values and overt behavior,” Schein (1985: 3) argues, “It is 
imperative to delve into the underlying assumptions, which are typically unconscious, but which 
actually determine how group members perceive, think, and feel.” These assumptions are 
constantly evolving within a negotiated order in such a way that they are largely taken-for-
granted, but also modified and adapted by members as patterns of interaction shift (Hallett and 
Ventresca 2006). They are institutional in nature, bound up in logics that constrain organizational 
life, but are themselves subject to interpretation and modification through the local interactions 
that invest them with their distinct capacity to exert organizational pressure (Hallett and 
Gougherty 2018, Hallett 2010, Hallett and Ventresca 2006). 
Inhabiting Institutions & Logics in Interaction 
Previous generations of organization studies scholars were attentive to the internal 
tensions shaping organizational life (Meyer and Rowan 1977). Armed with the intervening 
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advances in organizational theory, it is the task of contemporary researchers to correct the 
discipline’s macro-evolutionary drift (Hallett 2010: 55). McPherson and Sauder (2013: 166) 
suggest, “More work is needed to unpack how local actors mediate institutional demands and the 
requirements of day-to-day organizational activity.” By returning to an emphasis on local 
interactions and considering how the extra-local meanings systems of institutional logics are 
transformed in the process through which they become endogenous to organizations, an 
inhabited approach that is equally sensitive to institutional context and local pressures harkens 
back to the discipline’s neglected foundation (Hallett 2010: 66). Paramount to this perspective is 
the knowledge that local action is not simply pragmatic or unconscious (Haedicke 2012). 
Institutional logics consist of the “assumptions, values, beliefs, and rules by which individuals 
produce and reproduce their material subsistence, organize time and space, and provide meaning 
to their social reality,” (Thornton and Ocasio 2008: 804). Yet, while these logics are based in 
part on taken-for-granted assumptions, their interpretation and invocation requires people, who 
themselves have distinct convictions and motivations, to propel them, by way of interaction, 
through organizational settings (Everitt and Levinson 2016, McPherson and Sauder 2013, 
Haedicke 2012). In this way, institutions “establish the conditions of possibility,” but only 
acquire their force and meaning when instantiated by people in interaction (Hallett and Ventresca 
2006: 227). 
People in organizations use local cultures to translate and respond to institutional 
pressures (Haedicke 2012). Dorado (2013) draws on small group contexts to confound the idea 
of the institutional entrepreneur, arguing that institutional adaptations and innovation emerge 
from small group cultures. Others apply this outlook to demonstrate how different groups 
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promote their own permutations of institutional logics in order to legitimize competing 
organizational forms (Marquis and Lounsbury 2007, Dobbin and Zorn 2005, Lounsbury 2002) 
and to understand how prevailing logics can inform companies’ financial decision-making 
processes (Zajac and Westphal 2004). An institutional logics perspective links individual agency 
and cognition with the rule structures of institutional practice (Thornton and Ocasio 2008: 101). 
The legitimacy of prevailing institutions is preserved even when their logics are modified to meet 
local needs or are deployed in unpredictable ways. Thus, the taken-for-granted assumptions of 
institutional logics serve as the engines of institutional influence in organizations (McPherson 
and Sauder 2013: 185). Organizations, in fact, are precisely “places where institutional logics 
combine with local, embedded meanings to produce particular variations of local action,” 
(Binder 2007: 551). This comes about as people, in interaction, embrace logics, combine logics, 
challenge logics, and adapt them to meet their needs (Binder 2007: 568). As such, disagreements 
are inevitable, especially during periods of crisis when the stakes are high. We should consider 
how different groups within an organization and across all levels of its hierarchy might engage 
the same logics differently in pursuit of their own, often opposing, interests. Crucially, we must 
understand how these different groups enact a shared organizational culture even when adopting 
and emphasizing certain elements of a particular logic while ignoring that logic’s other aspects, 
as they go about reordering organizational life and working together, at times in concert and at 
other times in conflict, to construct their social world. 
The consequences of Lehman Brothers’ sudden and unexpected failure are not confined 
simply to those immediately experienced by the people beleaguered by the company’s collapse, 
nor even to just the global financial system. That which can be gleaned from the case of Lehman 
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Brothers concerns every dimension of social life into which the free-market mentality permeates. 
The multiple ways in which Lehman employees constructed ideas about talent, merit, and the 
free market illuminate broader trends regarding how and when free market institutional logics, 
and the assumptions they encompass, are deployed. While previous scholarship outlines the 
relationship between organizations and organizational cultures when they fail together, either 
permanently or partially, less scrutiny has been directed toward the ways organizational cultures 
might survive the complete failure of the organizations from which they initially emerge. 
Supplementing the literature in this way requires overcoming organizational sociology’s “macro-
evolutionary drift” and restoring emphasis on local interaction. This approach not only alerts 
researchers to the connections between local interaction and extra-local meanings systems, but 
also foregrounds the importance of organizational position and perspective in the interpretation 
process. Refocusing attention in this way brings to the surface the many ways organizational 
culture enables and constrains patterns of meaning making, while simultaneously being, itself, 
transformed through the local interactions within which these patterns emerge, are interpreted, 
and reenacted. 
Methods 
Explanations of financial crises offered by contemporary economic sociologists tend toward 
neoinstitutional accounts, emphasizing behavioral conformity, imitation, and even consolidation 
within the financial sector (Carruthers 2010, Pozner et. al. 2010), or “normal accidents” 
perspectives, which foreground the complexity and connectivity of the global banking system 
(Palmer and Maher 2010, Mezias 1994). Perrow (2010: 329) himself, however, posits a more 
agentive view of the 2007-2008 financial crisis, contending that financial executives were 
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complicit in a decades-long deregulation project while actively encouraging the acceleration of 
short-run self-interest, the results of which constitute “knowing malfeasance.” Perrow does not 
seem to be alone in this view, as the desire to discern guilt and condemn those responsible is 
seductive. Some of the search terms presented below, for example, which the bankruptcy 
examiner used to sort through Lehman Brothers emails, (see Figure 4; e.g. risk, punish, big 
trouble) indicate an interest in uncovering potential financial malfeasance. 
Given the inclination to assign blame, it is important to recall that not a single Lehman 
Brothers executive was indicted as a result of the bankruptcy. In fact, following the better part of 
a year spent reading through nearly four and a half million email exchanges without discovering 
illegal activity, the bankruptcy examiner characterized management decision making as 
exhibiting “serious but non-culpable errors of business judgment,” (Valukas 2010: 3). The 
examiner’s team, and later Congress, interviewed 250 former Lehman employees without 
unmasking a conspiracy. Lehman was not some malicious criminal enterprise. Accordingly, if 
the employees of Lehman Brothers, including the firm’s leadership, were not the intentional 
architects of the company’s demise, what were they doing as the walls began crumbling around 
them? How did employees on the inside of Lehman Brothers make sense of the firm’s decline? 
And importantly, how does an organizational culture pervaded by the free-market mentality and 
wont to extol the talents of its employees explain and accommodate for organizational failure? 
Data Analysis 
In 2010, Richard Swedberg (2010: 104) asserted, “that there were a series of decisions in the fall 
of 2008 that turned the credit crunch into a full-scale financial panic and that one of the most 
important of these involved the bankruptcy of Lehman Brothers.” Swedberg (2010:83-84) calls 
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the March 2010 bankruptcy examiner’s report, which was compiled using five million internal 
company documents, “the most exhaustive investigation of Lehman’s affairs,” and suggests that 
the pages of these documents may contain the insights necessary to discern how Lehman’s 
leadership understood the unfolding crisis. This project examines a collection of nine hundred 
and thirty-one company email exchanges made publicly available as appendices to the court-
appointed bankruptcy examiner’s report. Though I use the terms emails and email exchanges 
interchangeably throughout when describing the constituent components of the dataset, the 
examiner’s report labels and presents each set of email exchanges as an email chain, even those 
containing a single email. The email chains included below are reproduced as they appear in 
court records, preserving abbreviations, errors, and formatting wherever possible. Any 
corrections or clarifications necessary to ensure comprehension or make the exhibits more 
accessible, such as when employees use stock ticker symbols in place of full company names, 
are denoted with the use of brackets. The labels immediately following each email chain 
correspond to unique evidentiary exhibit identification numbers assigned by the United States 
Bankruptcy Court for the Southern District of New York. While previous scholars (Hallett 2003, 
Vaughan 1996) have utilized company documents, internal memoranda, and training materials to 
analyze the consequences of corporate culture, this project is among the first to use email 
archives to analyze the construction of shared meanings across an organizational culture. 
This collection of 931 email chains is the result of an extended filtering process by the 
bankruptcy examiner designed to identify internal communications most relevant to the 
disposition of remaining assets following the bankruptcy as well as to uncover potential financial 
malfeasance. This process required, what I call, a “branched bifurcation” selection regime  
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similar to the statistical recursive partitioning approach to Big Data (Breiman et. al. 1984; see 
Figure 2 for a simplified diagram of recursive partitioning). At the outset of the bankruptcy 
Figure 2. Recursive Partitioning 
 
proceedings the court-appointed examiner discovered three thousand terabytes of archived 
employee emails, or approximately 350 billion pages of text, dating back to May 2006. This 
mass of data was narrowed to include only those emails containing specific items of interest to 
the examiner. The preliminary search used specific keywords in various combinations and 
yielded 5.15 million emails, consisting of approximately thirty-four million pages of text. Initial 
search terms are presented in Figure 3 and constitute what is best defined as a “descriptive” filter, 
eliminating emails not relevant to the bank’s operations and management strategy. 
The results of the first search were filtered further in a secondary round of treatment. 
Contingent search terms are presented in Figure 4. This subsequent search returned 4,437,095 
emails, consisting of some twenty-six million pages of text. The contingent search terms seem to 
15 
	
Figure 3. Bankruptcy Examiner Initial Search Terms 
  
 
Figure 4. Bankruptcy Examiner Contingent Search Terms 
Figure 3 
Contingent Search Terms 
        Bad Company         Big Trouble          Breach 
             Concern               Desperate           Disaster 
            Get Out Of                      Just Between Us 
Let’s Discuss            Need Another 
Perception Issue            Punish            Real Objective 
                            Anxious             Risk  






represent a more targeted and punctilious approach to the remaining email chains. These 
secondary search terms appear to reveal the bankruptcy examiner’s interest in demonstrating 
financial malfeasance or corporate fraud at Lehman Brothers. It would be inappropriate, however, 
to cast this as a primary aim with any certainty, as this was never stated as a direct objective of 
the bankruptcy examiner’s team. Furthermore, while bankruptcy examiners have in the past 
uncovered executive negligence as well as flagrant malfeasance, with Enron being perhaps the 
most prominent example11, the primary function of the examiner is to serve as a mediator 
between creditors. In this capacity, it is important for the bankruptcy examiner, as chief legal 
investigator, to maintain the appearance of impartiality. Yet, contingent search terms such as: 
“risk, breach, and slippery slope,” do seem to, at least, suggest that the examiner was concerned 
about the possibility of management wrongdoing. 
Between April 7, 2009 and March 11, 2010 a team of eighty-one contract attorneys 
reviewed each email and coded them according to the substantive topic area of each document. 
The principal objective of this coding was to “code out” items devoid of any financial 
irregularities, thereby selecting only those emails that had the potential to suggest employee 
impropriety. It must be noted here that the presence of financial irregularities and allusions to 
employee impropriety do not necessarily correlate to illegality, but rather divergence from the 
firm’s publicly reported strategy and stated goals, which if undermined would adversely affect 
creditors and/or shareholders. Associates at the firm of the lead examiner, Jenner & Block, 
performed intercoder reliability checks throughout. Documents identified as potentially relevant 
by the first level of coding were submitted to corporate finance consultant Duff & Phelps for 
																																								 																				




more careful review and further coding. Duff & Phelps financial analysts separately coded the 
content of emails for any possible implications on the liquidation of Lehman’s remaining assets 
as well as the likelihood of and potential for corporate fraud. This stage of coding represents a 
shift from the more “exploratory” coding of Jenner & Block to a “selective” coding distinguished 
by more pragmatic considerations. Duff & Phelps’ proprietary coding strategy could rightly be 
described as a “coding in” process, as email exchanges deemed to be material to the disposition 
of Lehman’s assets against claims of creditors were included in the bankruptcy examiner’s report 
and made public by the court. These 931 email communications, representing approximately five 
thousand pages of transcribed text constitute the data considered below. 
The lack of transparency during the two rounds of coding described above amounts to a 
major limitation of the data. To date, the codes used to narrow the set of email exchanges from 
over four million to the 931 that were published have not been disclosed, nor has there been any 
indication that they will be. The codes used by Jenner & Block, which were meant to categorize 
the email chains by the topic areas of their content, remain unknown. As such, we cannot say 
how broad or focused these “topic areas” were. Moreover, while a small group of Jenner & 
Block associates did perform intercoder reliability checks throughout the duration of coding, it is 
unclear what criteria were used when applying codes in the first place. The examiner’s published 
report references a high rate of intercoder reliability, but does not reveal an exact number. What 
is more, we do not know how many associates were involved in reliability checks, nor how often 
these checks took place. While the report states that eighty-one contract attorneys were involved 
in the initial phase of coding, we know little about their professional backgrounds, qualifications, 
or possible predispositions toward Lehman Brothers. 
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With respect to the proprietary coding completed by Duff & Phelps, while the examiner’s 
report outlines more clearly that the aim of this round of coding was the identification of 
financial circumstances that could influence the resolution of Lehman’s outstanding debts, we, 
again, do not know how codes were generated, the criteria used to determine code application, or 
the identity and qualifications of those involved in the coding process. Importantly, though we 
know that nearly four and a half million email communications were subject to the coding 
regime, resulting in the 931 presented to the court, there is no indication of how many email 
chains were submitted to Duff & Phelps for consideration. Therefore, while we know the starting 
point and results of the coding process, all intermediary steps remain clouded in uncertainty. A 
diagram of the cumulative treatment of the source data is presented in Figure 5. 
Figure 5. Cumulative Source Data Treatment Diagram 
 
One particularly striking characteristic of the Lehman email data is the unprecedented 
level of access they grant to those ordinarily insulated from the social scientist’s gaze. Laura 
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Nader (1972: 302) first made the case for “studying up,” while simultaneously drawing attention 
to the challenges of doing so, namely that “the powerful… don’t want to be studied.” In his 
retrospective on Nader’s contribution, Gusterson (1997: 115) notes that qualitative methodology 
“does not travel well up the social structure.” Wall Street’s wealthy elite deploy their privilege to 
erect barriers, both literal and symbolic, which set them apart from society and obstruct access to 
and information about them. Mikecz (2012: 483) summarizes, “Elites are visible but not 
necessarily accessible.” Elites do not constitute a homogenous group, however, as power and 
privilege are not uniformly distributed even at the top (Domhoff 1990, 2018). As such, when 
studying elites, researchers should be careful to examine how the power relationships among 
elites influence how they construct meaning as they go about constructing the world (Declercq 
and Ayala 2017). The different administrative levels within a bureaucratic organization like 
Lehman Brothers only amplify the importance of respondents’ organizational position, as the 
power to act on meanings is diffused broadly at all levels of an organization’s hierarchy (Hallett 
2003, Martin 1992). 
Recent studies (Khan and Jerolmack 2013, Khan 2011, Ho 2009) primarily address the 
socialization of elites occupying a single social location, with little attention to how internal 
status differences within an elite group manifest in the process of sense-making. We do know 
that the email data considered below benefit from an expansive view of Lehman Brothers 
employees. The bankruptcy examiner’s staff narrowed the set of email exchanges to those 
ultimately included in the bankruptcy report without regard for correspondents’ position within 
the firm, from the mailroom to the boardroom. The surnames of several company executives do 
appear among the preliminary search terms (see Figure 3) and this reveals the examiner’s special 
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interest in the activities of Lehman’s leadership. Yet, while special attention was given to the 
emails of some, none of the original emails were excluded from consideration on the basis of job 
title alone. Furthermore, the use of internal emails overcomes the challenge of disentangling the 
company’s public position from the private views of Lehman personnel (Campbell 2002). Thus, 
the data used in this study represent a combination of exceptional depth and breadth (Ragin and 
Becker 1992), offering unparalleled access to 319 Lehman Brothers employees up and down the 
firm’s hierarchy during a momentous two-year period in the company’s history. This makes 
Lehman Brothers an exceptionally compelling case. Figure 6 presents a simplified outline of 
Lehman’s organizational hierarchy along with a tabulation of the number of employees in each 









Managing Directors  (123),  
Executive Vice Presidents, 
Directors (17) 
Rank and File Employees 
Senior Vice Presidents  (48), Vice Presidents  (43) 
Assistant Vice Presidents (8), Senior Associates  (11) 
Associates  (11), Analysts  (15), Interns (3) 
15 Members Selected from among 
the Firm’s Managing Directors 
(18 employees) 
•  3 internal relationship management advisors outside the firm’s traditional hierarchy 
•  19 employees could not be determined  
job classification appearing within the data. Employees are arranged into three groups, Lehman’s 
executive committee at the top, the firm’s rank-and-file employees at the bottom, and, as the 
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name suggests, middle management between the two. The rationale for grouping the company’s 
employees in this way rests on the fiercely hierarchical structure of the organization itself. The 
fifteen-member executive committee was comprised of Managing Directors appointed to that 
body by the firm’s Chief Executive Officer with the consent of Lehman’s Board of Directors. 
The executive committee served as the site of strategic decision making and was ultimately 
responsible for defining the firm’s goals and business plan. While it is unlikely that the 
Managing Directors that constitute this simplified hierarchy’s middle tier would have considered 
themselves “middle managers” in the conventional sense, I apply the label “middle 
management” for descriptive convenience and use three criteria to distinguish them from those 
above and below. First, those who occupy the middle level had P&L responsibility for some part 
of the business or held business unit oversight if they presided over a non-revenue generating 
division. Second, those in the middle tier enjoyed workflow autonomy, which is to say that they 
were able to direct how the work they did, or supervised, got done. Finally, notwithstanding 
these first two criteria, those situated in the middle of the hierarchy were not members of the 
executive committee and so were excluded from the formal company-wide decision-making 
processes that took place at the top and rippled downward through the firm. Employees that were 
not executive committee members and did not meet both of the other criteria above are 
considered junior employees among the company’s rank-and-file. As the criteria indicate, these 
are mutually exclusive groups, such that no employee may be classified as a member of two 
groups simultaneously, though, as we will see, people regularly move between groups as they are 
promoted, demoted, or reassigned. All three of the groups were quite monolithic in terms of a 
common consensus about their shared meanings and employees within each layer policed their 
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own peer group in multiple ways. Importantly, these patterns of meaning making rarely appear 
directly, but instead arise when the groups are forced to put their shared meanings into practice 
and decide how something ought to be done. While the evidence of relative consensus differs 
between the groups, just as the number of collective decisions confronting each group also 
differs, the data reveal increasing intragroup homogeneity as the organizational crisis deepens. 
Not only did the existence of strong group consensus along these hierarchical fault lines emerge 
during data analysis for this project, the bankruptcy examiner recently confirmed in a 2019 
interview that these same patterns of understanding likewise surfaced during the court’s original 
investigation of the bankruptcy as well.12 
In this project, I supplement the work of the bankruptcy examiner with original social 
scientific treatments of the Lehman Brothers email dataset, introducing a coding scheme 
sensitive to subjects’ perceptions (Carley 1993) and not just the financial consequences of 
employee conduct. This project centers the locally situated interactions of organizational actors 
in institutionally embedded relationships to examine how employees on the inside of Lehman 
Brothers made sense of the firm’s decline in order to understand how an organizational culture 
engrossed in extolling the acumen and expertise of its employees explained and accommodated 
for the organization’s failure. 
I began this ancillary coding stage by identifying the broad substantive themes within the 
data (Fereday and Muir-Cochrane 2006). The most promising of these themes was that of 
“efficiency,” which both features prominently in the bankruptcy examiner’s account and is the 
foremost result of an NVivo 12 stem frequency query when controlling for articles (i.e the, an) as 
																																								 																				
12 Deschamps, Jennifer. (Director). 2019. Inside Lehman Brothers. [Film]. Gravitas Pictures: A Red Arrow Studios 
Company in association with KM Productions and Intuitive Pictures. 
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well as all previously used search terms. These themes, especially “efficiency” and in particular 
how decisions about what is or is not efficient were made, informed an iterative thematic coding 
regime (Chambliss and Schutt 2012, Creswell 2007, 2003), under which I applied nonexclusive 
categorical codes based on the content of each email (Charmaz 2017, Corbin and Strauss 1990).  
I simultaneously organized the emails by date and tracked those involved as sender and 
recipient(s) in each exchange in order to locate the data within the prevailing historical context as 
well as the extra-local environment of the global banking industry (Burawoy 1998). I utilized 
hierarchical coding when “nesting” codes better captured empirical nuance without 
compromising the analytical reliability of established coding categories (Thomas 2006). 
The bankruptcy examiner’s report opens by counseling, “There are many reasons 
Lehman failed, and the responsibility is shared,” (Valukas 2010: 2). Still, with all of the many 
reasons for Lehman’s failure and all of the duly shared responsibility, one particular facet 
emerges repeatedly throughout the examiner’s account: market efficiency. The bankruptcy 
examiner bemoans management’s “implementation of an aggressive countercyclical business 
strategy,” deriding executives for eschewing the principles of efficiency (Valukas 2010: 45). 
Even designating this strategy “countercyclical” suggests that the market has some natural 
rhythm, which if ignored risks inducing inefficiency. True to his preamble, the bankruptcy 
examiner seized upon opportunities to divvy up the shared responsibility for Lehman’s undoing. 
In testimony before Congress he opined, “The SEC’s mission – clearly stated on its own website 
– is “to protect investors, maintain fair, orderly, and efficient markets, and facilitate capital 
formation.” The SEC’s role was not to simply absorb and acquiesce to Lehman’s decisions; the 
SEC’s role was to supervise and regulate to protect investors and the market,” (Government 
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Publishing Office 111-124). The examiner continued later to explain, “I found no evidence to 
suggest that Lehman withheld any information requested by any agency. But it is my conclusion 
that the government simply acquiesced to the information it was given; it took no regulatory 
action,” (Government Publishing Office 111-124). Ultimately, the examiner’s report concludes, 
“while certain of Lehman’s risk decisions can be described in retrospect as poor judgment, they 
were within the business judgment standard,” (Valukas 2010: 22). It is revealing that the 
bankruptcy examiner seemed just as interested in whether or not Lehman’s business decisions 
were efficient, as he was in whether or not they were legal. This insight provided a principal 
point of departure from which to mobilize the existing data through new social scientific coding 
protocol attentive to not only what is deemed efficient, but more importantly, who gets to decide 
what is efficient as well as how these determinations are made in concert and conflict with others 
across the organization. 
Organizational Positionality: Same Person, Different Position, Different Priorities 
Organizational culture and organizational structure are interconnected. They are reflectively 
reconstituted through the constant interactions of those within organizations. That is, they are 
mutually dependent and evolve in tandem, as people within an organization deploy cultural 
understandings to legitimize both new and existing structural patterns, while organizational 
structure influences which cultural understandings are deemed appropriate and available in the 
given organizational setting. This gives rise to a view of organizations as ongoing and negotiated 
processes rather than static, concrete entities. Studying organizations during periods of turmoil 
when internal instability is likely to result in myriad instantiations of the organizational process 
illuminates the relationship between organizational culture and organizational structure. 
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People experience and identify the needs of an organization differently based on their 
status and location within the organization, which I refer to as “organizational positionality.” 
That is, organizational groups leverage available cultural resources differently based upon how 
they are situated within the structure of the organization. This organizational positionality 
influences which interpretive strategies are used to make sense of events, as organizational 
structure shapes the very extent to which internal actors perceive events and, thus, affects the 
meanings that organizational events have for them. Following an employee through different 
positions across different status levels lays plain the way organizational positionality operates. 
In the exchange that follows, Ken Umezaki, a managing director of Fixed Income 
Business Strategy at the time, consults his middle management peers about how best to handle 
third quarter incentive compensation penalties for those employees who failed to meet their 
targets, noting that the Fixed Income Division as a whole was “over by $3.7 billion.” Umezaki 
continues by suggesting that they simply enforce existing policy and after receiving 
encouragement from his colleague, boasts that he “got $8 billion from the firm.” In other words, 
he received approval from the executive committee to increase the size of the Fixed Income 
Division balance sheet by $8 billion. Therefore, the Fixed Income Division was, in reality, nearly 
$12 billion off its quarterly target before Umezaki got approval to inflate the balance sheet, 
effectively shielding many Fixed Income employees from being penalized, at the expense of 
drastically increasing the amount of risk borne by the firm. Umezaki’s priority here appears to be 
advocating for Fixed Income Division employees and sheltering them from adverse 









Umezaki’s attitude changes considerably after he is offered the position of Chief Risk Officer 
and potentially a seat on the executive committee. In this interaction, nearly a year later, 
Umezaki is more concerned with the “team” and “the firm” in its entirety than he previously 
seemed. Rather than “fighting a good fight” for the employees of one particular division against 
the interests of another, Umezaki wants to help Lehman get its “mojo” back. While a year prior 
Umezaki could have been accused of being adversarial and surreptitious, with his elevation to 
the executive committee imminent he is more deferential, even bordering on obsequious at times. 
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Apart from the monumentally bad timing, as Lehman would go bankrupt only five days later, the 
second email reveals a further piece of irony in the way Umezaki characterizes Lehman’s risk 
appetite. Umezaki claims, “The history of ‘end arounds’ on risk decisions and process at the firm 
level is a major concern for me,” and yet less than a year prior Umezaki was, himself, utilizing 
“end arounds” to inflate the Fixed Income Division’s balance sheet in order to protect employee 
bonuses. As Umezaki’s organizational positionality changes so too does his orientation to risk 
and he acts in ways he perceives to be appropriate for each of his positions in the firm. 






Organizational Crisis: Enacting the Culture of Exceptionalism 
While it is well documented that organizational failures can take place alongside cultural 
collapse and disintegration (Fine and Hallett 2014, Weick 2010, Hallett 2003, Weick 1993), 
failures can also yield a unifying effect, whereby organizational constituents rally behind a single 
organizational culture when confronted with an external threat. Yet, how this single culture is 
interpreted by discrete groups within the organization, the ways they modify existing meanings 
to meet their needs, and, importantly, how they enact them are all informed and dependent upon 
their relationship to various organizational structures, that is: their organizational positionality. 
Rather than delivering the organization from crisis, this can lead to internal disagreements about 
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which courses of action are appropriate (e.g. efficient) or how things “ought to be done,” as the 
very organizational structures that color decision making are recast by competing organizational 
narratives. In this case, separate internal groups use the same cultural resources and language in 
the service of different ends, creating confusion about organizational priorities and compounding 
the existing crisis. That is, various intra-organizational groups can all lay claim to the same 
organizational culture, but do so in order to justify competing courses of action. Such was the 
case with Lehman Brothers. 
The scholarly appraisals of organizational crises discussed above, such as the 
revitalization of Nissan (Kotter and Heskett 1992), the Mann Gulch Fire (Weick 1993), the 
Plainfield Tornado (Fine and Hallett 2014), and the failure of Arthur Andersen (Hallett 2003), 
illustrate how organizational culture can change, fragment into multiple idiocultures, or collapse 
entirely during and in the aftermath of a crisis, spawning conflicting accounts of the crisis as well 
as rival opinions about who should address it. This was not the case with Lehman, however. 
Lehman Brothers’ culture did not disintegrate during the firm’s downfall. Unlike the 
organizational crises previously studied, there is scant evidence that Lehman splintered into 
warring factions, each guided by a distinct but familiar idioculture hewn from the formerly 
uniform norms and customs of the broader firm. By contrast, Lehman collapsed inward on itself, 
unified by the same organizational culture and united around a single organizational mythology. 
Lehman’s mythology was a familiar one, especially to those on Wall Street, as it was no 
different than the universally embraced tenet around which the whole industry was, itself, 
organized: meritocracy. At its core, Lehman’s organizational culture, its corporate mythology, 
was characterized by the belief that there was something exceptional about Lehman Brothers and 
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the people who worked there and, furthermore, that this quality was deserved, having been 
earned as a result of talent and ability. Those at Lehman Brothers often touted the firm’s history 
and previous accomplishments as well as their own personal successes in order to account for 
how such exceptional merit became and remained warranted. 
Previous research demonstrates how market logics came to dominate financial thinking 
and reshape the American corporation (Fligstein and Shin 2007, Fligstein 1990, Roy 1997). 
Tracing the changing contours of the American economy from the early nineteen-eighties 
onward, Davis (2009: 7) extends this examination into other social settings across all facets of 
everyday life, including employment and the labor market, illustrating how the “disruptions that 
accompany rapid market expansion provoke changed ways of thinking about social relations.” 
Recent scholarship shows how talent is socially constructed and institutionalized in ways that 
favor some traits over others, allowing elite groups to extract structural advantages that 
perpetuate their unearned privilege (Mijs 2020). Assumptions about the moral deservingness of 
those to whom talent is attributed have themselves become an institutional force that is mediated 
through the day-to-day interactions of formal organizations like Lehman Brothers. 
Though Lehman employees shared the same convictions concerning talent, which served 
as the firm’s cultural cornerstone, the way that employees modified these meanings and, perhaps 
more importantly, how groups of employees engaged and enacted these meanings in practice 
were different for various internal segments of the company. Lehman was an echo chamber 
within which a giant game of “telephone” was underway. Nowhere did the “wires get crossed” 
more than between the hierarchical levels of the organizational chart. The executive committee, 
middle managers, and junior rank and file repeated the same message using the specialized 
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financial vocabulary that indicated mastery of a common manufactured and complex 
professional expertise, but the ends to which this effort was directed were quite different for each 
group. For example, what “efficiency” meant and what was considered “efficient” by the three 
contingents were informed by each group’s relationship to the history of the firm’s cultural 
narrative. Several of those on the executive committee had been Lehman employees since before 
the firm broke away from American Express in 1994. Even more were employed by the time the 
firm weathered the 1998 Russian financial crisis. In contrast, few middle managers and almost 
none of the rank and file had been involved in Lehman’s past trials and triumphs. A brief 
timeline of the relevant history of Lehman Brothers is presented in Figure 9. The organizational 
structure of professional networks and personal employment histories, then, both enabled and 
constrained the collective memories of each hierarchical group throughout the period of crisis. 
Consequently, interpretations of the unfolding crisis by each group were read through the shared 
knowledge and experiences to which they had access. 
Lehman’s collapse did not cause its organizational culture to disintegrate. If anything, the 
crisis led to employees clinging even more closely to Lehman’s existing organizational identity, 
reasserting the beliefs, rules, and norms that they perceived to be underpinning the whole 
endeavor. The tight unity that this produced brought with it new tensions, however, as conflicts 
and confusion emerged concerning how to respond to organizational challenges even though the 
various layers of the organization’s hierarchy shared a common explanation of the crisis. 
Organizational groups leverage available cultural resources differently based upon how they are 
situated within the structure of the organization, but they also combine these with modified and 
adapted cultural strategies drawn from existing repertoires accumulated across diverse 
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organizational histories and personal experiences, especially those perceived to have been 
successful in some earlier context (Dorado 2013, Hallett 2003). As a consequence, shared 
cultural resources often shape organizational life in inconsistent and unexpected ways when 
imported from one context and reinterpreted through interaction with one’s peers in another 
(Haedicke 2012). Previous scholarship documents how different internal groups develop and 
promote competing cultural explanations to legitimize different organizational forms (Marquis 
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and Lounsbury 2007, Dobbin and Zorn 2005, Lounsbury 2002). This project endeavors to reveal 
how different groups at Lehman Brothers adhered to a shared culture while plying this common 
frame of reference to advance opposing organizational priorities in order to demonstrate how it is 
possible for organizational culture to survive the complete collapse of the organization from 
which it emerged. 
When institutional logics are invoked to legitimize organizational forms and behaviors, 
they are indelibly altered in the process of these interactions (Owen-Smith 2011, Hallett 2010). 
Logics, as well as the organizational practices they inform and by which they are composed, are, 
thus, greater than the sum of their constituent parts (Hallett 2003). As people move through 
organizations by entering and exiting, being promoted, or reassigned their organizational 
positionality necessarily changes. They learn, modify, and adapt new interpretive strategies as a 
result of their movement through organizations, which they retain and continue to adapt in 
concert with others to meet the new contingencies posed by different organizational settings. 
They find new uses for existing institutional logics and refashion these logics in novel and 
unexpected ways when they set about doing things together. Thus, the interpretive strategies 
used to make sense of events are themselves conditioned by organizationally situated interactions 
and the meanings that actions have for people where and when they occur. As this suggests, 
Lehman’s executives, middle managers, and the junior rank and file leveraged a shared cultural 
orientation to promote different organizational priorities based on how they were situated within 





THE EXECUTIVE COMMITTEE 
 
The position of those on the executive committee was that Lehman’s “counter-cyclical” strategy 
was intentional and that the situation was well under control. They explained as much to the 
Board of Directors in March 2007. Minutes from that meeting disclose that members of the 
executive committee were under no illusion about the state of the market, characterizing the 
situation as a “distressed environment.” They even anticipated a “fallout” in the housing market, 
which would cause some firms to fail, leading to reduced competition in the industry. However, 
the executive committee fully expected these obstacles to yield opportunities for growth just as 
they had during the 1998 Russian financial crisis. The message was clear. Present troubles 
provided potential opportunities for those unafraid of pursuing them. Lehman had a history of 
exploiting such opportunities, catapulting itself into position as the fourth largest investment 
bank on Wall Street behind the strength of its spectacular successes in the late 1990s and early 
2000s. This time would be no different. 
The minutes of the January 2008 Board of Directors meeting echo these sentiments. The 
official record of that meeting opens with the pronouncement, emblazoned in bold, that “the 
current environment presents a unique long-term growth opportunity for the Firm.” There can be 
little doubt that Lehman executives thought their current situation akin to the previous 
opportunities they had leveraged to “improve our competitive position” and “generate superior 
returns.” The summary of this meeting even includes a section describing “The Firm’s
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Performance During Last Downturn.” This section recounts the financial achievements and 
industry accolades Lehman accumulated during that period and attributes them to management’s 
“counter-cyclical growth strategy.” 
Figure 10. March ’07 Board of Directors Meeting Notes 
 
LBHI_SEC07940_025834-025844 
These reports to Lehman’s Board of Directors make it clear that the executive committee 
viewed the financial market’s instability as an opportunity and aimed to seize on it. Lest the 
Board confuse Lehman’s current circumstances with coincidence, these meetings served to 
clarify for them the correct message. Lehman’s counter-cyclical measures were calculated and 
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deliberate. The strategy had worked before. And the executive committee both understood the 
ongoing market turmoil and had command of the situation. Moreover, references in both 
meetings to “high quality personnel” and “investing in talent” betray the sense that Lehman, and 
its employees, had earned its expanded business franchise by identifying growth opportunities 
too often overlooked by competitors. The Firm’s success was not a matter of happenstance, but 
due to the talent and tenacity of its employees, who stood undaunted at the call to do it again. 








The situation changed little following the coerced sale of Lehman’s competitor, Bear 
Stearns, to JPMorgan Chase. Following major losses and a credit rating downgrade in the fourth 
quarter of 2007, Bear Stearns found itself in immediate need of liquidity and in March 2008 
turned to the Federal Reserve Bank of New York for help. The Federal Reserve agreed to 
purchase $30 billion of Bear Stearns’ toxic assets on the condition that Bear consent to be 
purchased by JPMorgan Chase for $2 dollars per share, representing a discount of over 90 
percent from what its market value had been just two days before. The price was later raised to 
$10 per share, but this was still well below even one percent of what the company’s value had 
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been only a year earlier. On March 16th, 2008, JPMorgan announced its acquisition of Bear 
Stearns in what many characterized as a “sweetheart deal” arranged by Secretary of the Treasury, 
Hank Paulson, and underwritten by the Federal Reserve. This shock to the financial system did 
little to shake the resolve of Lehman’s executives, however. After all, Bear Stearns was not the 
storied Lehman Brothers. Roger Nagioff, Lehman’s short-lived co-Chief Operating Officer, and 
his team made this outlook abundantly clear as he prepared to present before his peers on the 
executive committee. The spirit of Nagioff’s presentation was inescapable. Competitor 
investment banks were racked with instability at the top, with Bear Stearns even being helmed by 
an “absentee CEO pothead,” whereas Lehman’s leadership was calculating and steadfast against 
the ebbs and flows of an uncertain financial market. 
Figure 12. Nagioff’s Presentation Prep 
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Nagioff was not alone in his view of Lehman’s leadership constituting a bulwark against 
foreboding tides. Without exception, his colleagues on the executive committee considered 
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themselves a remarkable team capable of traversing any crisis, not the least among them being 
Chairman and Chief Executive Officer, Dick Fuld. 
In the wake of Bear’s failure and government-facilitated sale, Fuld contacted Warren 
Buffett on March 28th, encouraging him to invest in Lehman Brothers. Fuld hoped that an 
investment by the world’s most well known investor would improve the market’s perception of 
Lehman and serve to further separate it from the beleaguered reputation of Bear Stearns. To Fuld, 
Buffett and Lehman Brothers were the perfect pairing. Both had consistently defied the odds and 
found value where others were afraid to venture. Buffet’s own philosophy of “be fearful when 
others are greedy and get greedy when others are fearful” paralleled Lehman’s “counter-cyclical 
strategy.” A public declaration of confidence from Warren Buffett would go a long way toward 
helping Lehman Brothers replicate its past successes. On the day of their conversation, Fuld sent 
a follow-up letter by courier that offered the assurance, “Our firm is poised to return to greatness, 
and many of Bear’s clients are coming our way.” Fuld ends with a resounding endorsement of 
Lehman’s executive committee, concluding the letter: 
In summary, let me again thank you for agreeing to meet with us. I believe that 
you’ve been presented with a unique investment opportunity, and one that is sure 
to be successful. Your hallmark is to invest in top-notch management teams, and I 
humbly submit that we’ve demonstrated that we can navigate difficult waters. 
Fuld thought he was making Buffett an offer that he could not possibly refuse. Lehman’s 
management team was simply too good for anyone, including Buffett, to question. After all, 
Lehman’s executives had successfully negotiated multiple tumultuous markets in the past. So 
confident was Fuld, in fact, that he directed his administrative staff to draft a detailed 
announcement of Lehman’s new partnership with Warren Buffett the day before their meeting 
even took place. 
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Fuld’s “Dear Colleague” letter refines the messages previously delivered to the Board of 
Directors, defending the company’s “counter-cyclical” strategy and declaring at the outset that 
Lehman “is well positioned to deliver industry-leading growth and profitability across all parts of 
the market cycle.” Fuld acknowledges the fragile condition of the market, stipulating that it is, in 
part, driven by “often inaccurate market rumors,” before trumpeting Buffett’s pending 
investment as “an enormous tribute” to Lehman’s strength and growth. The announcement, 
written the day before Fuld would speak with Buffett, continues, “the world’s most respected 
investor, has decided to invest $3.5 billion in our Firm.” Unfortunately, Fuld’s decision to have 
such a letter drafted was premature, as the three and a half billion-dollar investment from Warren 
Buffett never materialized. However, the letter itself is telling, as the remainder of the draft 
resonates the very same assertiveness and self-assurance vocalized by other executives at 
Lehman Brothers. 
Fuld’s vague description of how the anticipated capital from Buffett will be used does not 
indicate any intention of altering the firm’s investment strategy whatsoever. The problem is 
simply not Lehman Brothers, but the “confidence of investors.” Therefore, leadership need not 
change tack. All that is required of them is to signal the existing strength of the firm. One method 
of accomplishing this is for the executive committee to, as the saying goes, put their money 
where their mouth is. Subject to the committee’s approval, Fuld promises, “our entire Executive 
Committee has also committed to receiving its 2008 incentive compensation in this same form.” 
Of course, the other way Fuld seeks to signal the Firm’s existing strength is by associating 
Lehman with Warren Buffett and distancing it from Bear Stearns and other failed investment 
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banks of that ilk. Citing Buffett’s record of success, Fuld plainly and unabashedly places Lehman 
in the esteemed company of Coca Cola and GEICO. 
It may be tempting to dismiss Fuld’s unwavering confidence in his firm as bluster for the 
benefit of an external audience or a relatively withdrawn Board of Directors. Yet, this same rosy 
messaging was being communicated down to middle management and the rank and file 
employees below them. Moreover, the other members of the executive committee shared Fuld’s 
confidence that the company’s employees were fully capable of repeating Lehman’s past 
accomplishments. 







When confronted with questions about the possibility of Lehman being downgraded by 
credit rating agencies as well as the effects of such an event, newly minted Chief Financial 
Officer, Ian Lowitt’s, response could be fittingly described as indifferent. Though Lowitt is not 
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entirely dismissive, as he does furnish an answer in the exchange below, he appears altogether 
unconcerned that a downgrade “will affect lines and willingness of counterparties” to lend to 
Lehman Brothers, concluding, “We have operated at BBB+ before.” 
Credit rating agencies evaluate corporate debt using a scale ranging from AAA to D, 
which indicates default. At the time of the above exchange, most of Lehman Brothers’ debt was 
rated as A1 (A+), with some debt instruments even rising to the Aa3 (AA-) level, both of which 
indicate highly rated credit. A corporation’s credit worthiness, as illustrated by its rating, is 
important not only because it influences the interest rate that the company will pay when it issues 
bonds, but also because it generally governs the amount of collateral property that lenders will 
demand the company pledge in order to get and keep a loan. To illustrate, if Lehman’s credit 
rating fell one rung from A1 (A+) to A2 (A-), Lowitt reports the firm would be forced to post an 
additional $700 million of collateral to secure existing lines of credit. Less than two weeks after 
this exchange, Lehman Brothers was, indeed, downgraded. 







Lowitt’s casual response would be startling, were it not so precisely aligned with what 
others on the executive committee were saying. Lehman had spurned Wall Street’s conventional 
wisdom before to great avail, doubling-down on positions whose value seemed to be in free fall. 
Lehman’s hallmark, in fact, was its “counter-cyclical” strategy. When Lehman’s credit rating 
was in jeopardy of a manifold downgrade during the one-two-punch of 1998’s Russian financial 
crisis followed by the collapse of hedge fund Long-Term Capital Management, Lehman ended 
the year with stable, if not slightly increased, revenue and the next year their stock price doubled. 
Sharply declining crude oil prices and economic instability in Southeast Asia during 1997 had 
depleted Russia’s foreign exchange reserves. In the midst of growing civil unrest internally, the 
Russian government devalued the ruble and defaulted on its debt in August 1998. On Wall Street, 
rumors abounded about which firms had the greatest exposure to the, now worthless, Russian 
debt. As whispers circulated, some wondered aloud whether the Russian financial crisis would 
prove the largely untested Lehman Brothers’ ruin. In fact, Lehman did very little business in 
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Russia because CEO Dick Fuld considered the whole country to be “the world’s biggest 
[expletive] crime syndicate.” On the other hand, Long-Term Capital Management relied on 
“emerging market” debt, in particular Russian bonds, as the backbone of their convergence 
arbitrage strategy. LTCM had been founded by Nobel Prize-winning economists Robert Merton 
and Myron Scholes and counted nearly every Wall Street bank an investor, except Lehman 
Brothers. Within one month of Russia’s default, the value of LTCM was cut in half and investors 
began heading for the exits, as Wall Street reeled. Not only was Lehman Brothers unscathed, 
they seized on their good fortune to buy over one billion dollars of call options on 10-year US 
Treasuries, which they eventually sold for a profit many times over. On conference calls at the 
time, Fuld heralded employees’ ingenuity and urged them to “bleed Lehman green.” The 
executive committee’s commitment to a “counter-cyclical” strategy and its faith in the elite talent 
and tenacity of employees were immutable. So much so, in fact, that after barely one month in 
his new role, CFO Ian Lowitt had adapted and honed the talking points for his new position. So 
what if Lehman gets downgraded? They had operated under worse conditions before. 
Lowitt’s decision to reference a far worse credit rating than the A2 (A-) grade originally 
mentioned in the query is significant, as it is evocative of the executive committee’s mood with 
respect to internal trepidation. Felder is simply inquiring about the not implausible possibility of 
a credit downgrade and the consequences that will accompany being knocked down one rung. He 
receives an answer from Lowitt along with the indirect reproof that Lehman has and, it is 
insinuated, would manage to survive being downgraded a full three levels to BBB+, which is 
only slightly above “junk bond” status. Lowitt’s tone communicates the executive committee’s 
position that it will not permit disquiet among staff, especially from one who should know better. 
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Felder, who will feature considerably later on, was a fourteen-year veteran of Lehman Brothers, 
having endured all of the company’s recent trials and achieving a position as a Managing 
Director of Credit Strategy for Global Fixed Income. Felder was not just another middle manager. 
He was senior management in his own right. He had been through the wars and knew all about 
Lehman’s penchant for bucking market trends. Now, to the dismay of the new CFO, he demurred. 
The executive committee’s exacting standard of adherence to the well-established beliefs 
and practices they credited with the firm’s success was not reserved solely for middle 
management, nor even for more senior personnel like Felder. Within their own ranks as well, 
those on the executive committee demanded allegiance to the view that Lehman was exceptional. 
And they held one another accountable for the strength of their convictions that Lehman Brothers 
stood alone in its mastery of the financial markets, as in the exchange that follows. 
Doubts and Rejoinder: No Blinking 
In the late summer of 2007, Lowitt had yet to be made CFO and was serving as the co-Chief 
Administrative Officer for Finance. Filling the role of Chief Financial Officer was Chris 
O’Meara, who, in the wake of the nascent crisis in the subprime mortgage market, circulated a 
Wall Street Journal article that drew into question the wisdom of Lehman’s $22 billion 
acquisition of Archstone-Smith, an apartment building investment and management company. 
The recipients of O’Meara’s email were a veritable who’s who of financial decision makers at 
Lehman, including the future CFO from the foregoing discussion, Ian Lowitt, who began his 
rapid ascent into increasingly senior roles in 2006 after joining Lehman Brothers as a director in 
1994. Appearing alongside him on the recipient list are Ed Grieb, Lehman’s Corporate Financial 
Controller since 1991; Treasurer Paolo Tonucci, a twelve-year company veteran; the cat-of-nine-
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lives Dave Goldfarb, who had survived successive demotions from the positions of Chief 
Financial Officer and then Chief Administrative Officer, but somehow managed to keep his 
place on the executive committee in the invented and largely ceremonial role of Global Director 
of Strategic Partnerships; and the email’s eventual respondent Gerry Reilly, the longtime Global 
Product Portfolio Controller. All of whom, in fact, did “bleed Lehman green.” 
O’Meara’s email belies the typical confidence characteristic of those on the executive 
committee. This was certainly not the first time Lehman had been the subject of negative press, 
but it clearly weighed on O’Meara enough to share it. The CFO’s late-night forwarding of such a 
critical article suggests that he was beginning to waver. Perhaps the firm’s aggressive strategy 
was finally keeping him up at night. Whatever the case, his email accommodates the possibility 
that “Lehman may be better off paying a $1.5 billion break-up fee” to back out of the Archstone 
deal, which would have been unfathomable to his peers on the executive committee. Lehman did 
not just give money away for nothing. Years earlier in 1998 when Wall Street’s most prominent 
CEOs organized a privately funded multibillion-dollar bailout of the hedge fund Long-Term 
Capital Management in order to avert a collapse of the equities market, Dick Fuld refused to “put 
in any goddamned money” and Lehman declined to assist with the bailout. Handouts, in any 
form, were not something Lehman did. It would succeed or fail on the merits of its employees, 
not compensatory payments enabling it to skirt the mistakes of others. As such, the source of 
O’Meara’s apprehension constitutes a far worse transgression. 
Before summarizing the article’s position, O’Meara calls attention to its reference “to a 
Citi real estate investment trust analyst.” The suggestion, however implicit or indirect, that 
Citigroup might have discovered something overlooked by Lehman or, worse yet, that the 
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possibility exists for a Citigroup analyst’s talents to equal those found within Lehman Brothers 
was simply inexcusable. In the early morning hours not long after sending the email, O’Meara 
receives the two-word reply, “No blinking.” 




There was no place for second-guessing at Lehman Brothers, much less among the 
members of the executive committee. Ultimately, Lehman did finalize the deal to acquire 
Archstone on October 5, 2007, but O’Meara did not remain on the executive committee long 
enough to see it. Before the end of the summer he was quietly removed from the committee, 




The executive committee was firm in its commitment to the “counter-cyclical” strategy 
that brought the bank to prominence and resolute in its belief that it had the brightest minds on 
Wall Street at its disposal. Among them, Lehman’s leaders were convinced, was Erin Callan. 
When asked why he had hired an internal candidate without a background in accounting to serve 
as Chief Financial Officer, Dick Fuld told reports, “Lehman Brothers’ success depends in large 
part on leveraging our best people’s strengths and experiences,” (White 2007). Frankly, Callan’s 
pedigree rivaled any of her peers’ on the executive committee. The Harvard graduate had studied 
tax law at NYU and quickly gained a reputation as a rising star after joining the firm in 1995. 
This most recent promotion placed the 41-year-old among the top three women on Wall Street. 
She was the embodiment of Lehman’s meritocracy. 
Einhorn’s Critique and Callan’s Counter 
During her first two quarters in the role, Lehman reported sizable profits at a time when its 
competitors were losing money hand over fist. Despite these early successes, many on Wall 
Street were beginning to wonder how Lehman had seemingly plunged headlong into the crisis, 
yet remained unscathed. Internally, the cracks were already apparent, as Lehman prepared to 
report a nearly $3 billion loss in the second quarter of 2008. Even so, these losses were still not 
enough to unnerve the members of the executive committee. After all, some interim losses are 
not entirely unexpected when undertaking a counter-cyclical strategy. Still, as Lehman’s stock 
price continued to decline, the company’s executives became more and more convinced that 
someone wasn’t playing fairly. Eventually, their sights settled squarely on upstart, activist 
investor David Einhorn of Greenlight Capital. To this point, Einhorn was a one-hit-wonder after 
making hay by short selling Allied Capital well in advance of the public revelation that Allied 
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was essentially worthless. Now, he was making the rounds on television and at industry 
conferences, telling anyone willing to listen that Lehman was next. Callan was tasked with 
bringing this cheat to heel and on Friday, May 16 she called Einhorn after his latest disparaging 
remarks. 
Callan, like the rest of Lehman’s executive committee, thought Einhorn was attempting 
to game the system. Not only did Einhorn have the gall to doubt Lehman’s management 
practices, he did so openly and in front of the media no less. At the time of their phone call, 
Lehman was still somewhat of a Wall Street darling, having so far avoided the massive losses 
suffered by many of its peers, at least publicly. Yet, its stock price remained in decline, keeping 
lockstep with other financial sector stocks as the whole industry traded lower. Einhorn had been 
short selling Lehman shares since at least July 2007, helping depress prices, and his considerable 
short position had already produced a decent return. Now, apparently unsatisfied with his present 
gains, he was vocally deriding Lehman Brothers. Einhorn stood to benefit mightily if Lehman’s 
stock price continued its slide, and his public criticisms seemed to make this eventuality all the 
more likely. Members of Lehman’s executive committee blamed Einhorn for their slumping 
stock price and the firm’s deteriorating financial condition. 
Callan considered it her responsibility to convince Einhorn to refrain from casting further 
aspersions. What’s more, as Wall Street’s rising star and by this time the face of the firm, she 
had come to believe that she commanded sufficient influence to accomplish this. In the email 
exchange that follows, Callan expresses a desire to engage Einhorn in an open and honest 
dialogue to see if she can get him “more comfortable with Lehman Brothers.” She subsequently 
explains, “there has been good reason to trust that my counterparts were acting fairly.” Sadly, she 
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announces, “I come away from our conversation Friday and this e-mail below feeling you have 
been very disingenuous.” Callan claims to have contacted Einhorn in good faith, extending to 
him the benefit of the doubt, only to discover that he plans to discuss their conversation publicly 
and once more criticize Lehman Brothers in clear violation of her trust. She feels set up and is 
certain that Einhorn will “now cherry pick what you like out of the conversation to suit your 
thesis.” To Callan, Einhorn’s actions constitute a bait-and-switch. “As someone new in her seat” 
just learning how to fill the role of CFO, she worries she has fallen prey to Einhorn’s duplicity. 
Following this revelation, she no longer deigns to indulge Einhorn, stating “it does not seem 
prudent on my part to engage in any further conversations with you going forward.” She has her 
staff follow up on Einhorn’s open questions then cuts off communication. 






Whether or not Einhorn acted disingenuously, as Callan claims, is up for debate, though 
he certainly did not think he had (see Appendix A for his reply). Einhorn’s short position, on the 
other hand, as a matter of public record, is patently not in dispute, nor had he given Callan any 
indication that he would refrain from making further remarks in the future. In fact, during their 
exchange, he twice stresses his inclination to give Callan every opportunity to clarify Lehman’s 
position and, furthermore, appears willing to change his view given new information, noting, 
“This is not a final decision.” Callan, for her part, levels accusations of “cherry picking” before 
knowing exactly what he plans to say or even seeing his presentation. This exchange and 
Callan’s reaction to it makes Lehman’s explanation of the unfolding crisis abundantly clear: 
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Lehman was not to blame. Their troubles, whatever they might be, were entirely due to the 
misdeeds of someone else. 
The executive committee was unable to fault the firm’s strategy, liquidity, or real estate 
exposure for its increasingly precarious position. Committee members did not see how policies 
that had worked so well before could possibly factor in their current dilemma. They instead held 
that Lehman had a perception problem, fueled largely by the allegations bandied about by short 
sellers like Einhorn. Lehman was a victim of market manipulation plain and simple. This outlook 
is illustrated in the amount of time Callan spent directly corresponding with Einhorn, which was 
inordinate for a CFO. Rather than spend time scrutinizing balance sheets or reviewing the firm’s 
risk calculus, Callan devoted time to engaging a relatively obscure hedge fund manager, 
including attempts at rebutting him publicly later on. Callan blamed Einhorn and opportunists 
like him for circulating market rumors that disadvantaged the firm and, moreover, she was far 
from alone in this view. 
Appealing to SEC to Stop Einhorn’s Attacks 
When it became apparent that Einhorn would not be accommodating, Callan began exploring 
legal remedies to his invective. Shortly after their exchange, an opportunity rather fortuitously 
presented itself in the form of an email from a “concerned client.” Callan forwarded the letter on 
to Beth Rudofker, who in turn passed it to her contacts at the SEC. Several of the elements 
included in Rudofker’s note are instructive. First, Lehman’s response in the Wall Street Journal 
to Einhorn’s “disruptive behavior” is incongruous with the tenor of such an appeal to the SEC. 
They claim that they “will not continue to refute Mr. Einhorn’s allegations,” and, yet, here they 
are refuting said allegations by lodging a complaint with a regulatory agency. The executive 
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committee seems manifestly unable to just disregard Einhorn, equating him with the root of their 
problems. Next, the language used by the concerned client in the included attachment is 
strikingly similar to the executive committee’s own rhetoric. The remark “the same occurred in 
2002, 1991, and other periods of market disruption,” in particular, sounds as though it could have 
been lifted directly from Lehman memoranda. The juxtaposition between “honest and quiet 
investors” and “individuals of questionable integrity and motivation,” likewise, has a familiar 
ring. This could be coincidental, but the disclosure that Starr’s daughter works for Lehman 
Brothers introduces the possibility that similar talking points may have earlier been internally 
transmitted in response to rumblings within the rank and file, which is eminently plausible, as we 
will see in later chapters.  
By far the most remarkable thing about this complaint to the SEC, however, is who sent it. 
Though Tom Russo, Lehman’s chief legal counsel, and Bari Wolfe, the firm’s director of 
regulatory affairs, are included on the email, they did not send it. The email instead comes from 
Beth Rudofker, head of internal audit. This ought to be a puzzling turn. As Lehman was 
preparing to announce a nearly $3 billion quarterly loss, their principal internal auditor was not 
poring over financial statements or reevaluating operational controls, but had been enlisted in a 
glorified witch-hunt by the Chief Financial Officer. Of course, as it turns out, this is not quite as 
puzzling as it ought to be. Those on the executive committee were not concerned by the firm’s 
risk calculus and attendant lack of liquidity, having convinced themselves that they had been in 
similar situations before. The only difference this time around was David Einhorn and the legion 
of short sellers eroding confidence in the firm, who had to be stopped. Notwithstanding the 
executive committee’s attitude concerning who was at fault for their faltering fortunes, there 
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persists the question of why the preceding grievance was not brought to the attention of the SEC 
by Russo or Wolfe, both of whom are included on the email and, as lawyers, were ostensibly 
better situated to do so. Yet, the choice of Rudofker as messenger was not without reason. She 
had had an ongoing relationship and almost daily interactions with the SEC investigators since 
they had taken up residence inside Lehman’s own offices shortly after the collapse of Bear 
Stearns some three months prior. Ironically enough, they had been tasked with inspecting 
Lehman’s financial records for exactly the kind of underhanded financial engineering Einhorn 
had been alleging. 









The executive committee’s preoccupation with Einhorn stemmed from their conviction 
that the ship was not sinking, but rather was under attack. They judged their course of action to 
be dispassionate and deliberate, and more importantly it had worked before. The only 
complication that stood to frustrate their strategy was the market manipulation brought on by 
unscrupulous short sellers. Still, with the enormous talents of their employees behind them, 
Lehman executives were convinced that this latest challenge was just the next difficulty they 
were already poised to overcome. An earlier email exchange between Fuld and Goldfard in the 
midst of similar negative rumors encapsulates this attitude. 







 Members of the executive committee had no illusions about the difficulties confronting 
them. Negotiating the existing market turmoil would not be easy. It would take hard work and an 
all-hands-on-deck approach, but “the Bros always wins.” Their outlook was such that instability 
corresponded with opportunity, and they planned to reap windfalls on this occasion, as they had 
several times before. The talent and tenacity of those at Lehman, they thought, would allow them 
to exploit the developing financial crisis to their considerable advantage. Lehman had time and 
again proven its exceptional prowess in navigating just these types of events. This time would be 







Lehman’s middle management occupied a very different place within the firm’s organizational 
structure. They were excluded from executive committee meetings and were rarely, if ever, 
asked to attend presentations before the Board of Directors. Though they shared the executives’ 
optimistic outlook on the prospects of the firm in turbulent times, middle management was less 
concerned that outsiders would see weaknesses in Lehman Brothers, and more concerned that 
Lehman executives act in order to secure the continued prosperity of the firm and its employees. 
In fact, middle management had long sought to alter the firm’s capital structure by issuing more 
equity.  In August 2008, they may not have been keen on a prospective deal with Korea 
Development Bank specifically, but at least it seemed as if leadership was taking actionable steps 
toward raising capital.  
By June 2008, Eric Felder had already begun marshaling his team’s talents toward 
tangible action. Felder, a senior manager in Lehman’s Fixed Income Division, recognizes that 
Lehman’s second quarter earnings report will be damaging and instructs his team to use an 
internal company chat room to align their trading levels in advance of the announcement. In fact, 
a week later Lehman would report a massive loss, its first quarterly loss since going public in 
1994. The firm’s treasurer, Paolo Tonucci, is included on the chat room invitation probably 
because Felder was hoping to garner support among the executive committee and suspected that 
Tonucci would be the member most sympathetic to his proposal. At first, Tonucci voices
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optimism at reports “that things going well,” as a possible deal with Korea Development Bank 
was beginning to materialize. However, the prospect of a Korea deal is not enough to placate 
Felder, who wants to have a “plan b” ready. Stressing that the lack of a viable backup plan is not 
an option, he says, “We need to have a plan b. If we report the loss without an equity raise it will 
not end well.” Tonucci reports that he is “pushing as hard as I can,” but insists, “there is a high 
level of optimism that the Korea deal will work out.” 














The executive committee was hopeful that a deal with Korea Development Bank could be 
negotiated on more favorable terms than they could achieve by selling shares on the open market. 
In addition, most on the committee were not entirely convinced that the bank needed to issue 
equity in order to raise capital. If, indeed, they did decide to issue equity, members of the 
executive committee preferred the quieter approach of cultivating a single strategic partner, like 
Warren Buffett or Korea Development Bank, to meet their capital needs. They expected a large 
capital injection from one strategic partner would avoid tarnishing perceptions of the firm, and 
securing the right partner might even elevate the bank’s reputation. 
This approach did not sit well with middle management, however. They were disaffected 
by the executives’ protracted search for the perfect magic bullet to the firm’s woes. They agreed 
that the firm had a perception problem, but suspected that this stemmed from the bank’s leverage 
ratio, which could be corrected by taking immediate and measurable action. Middle management 
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felt that a solution to the crisis was not just going to happen on its own. They would need to 
make it happen. So, while Lehman’s leadership conjectured about a Korean deal and fabricated a 
Warren Buffett rescue, Felder directed his team to communicate and collaborate on more 
actionable solutions. Felder’s team chat room was not the only time that middle management 
attempted to organize its own response in the face of executive inaction, nor was it even the first. 
Well before the problems in the credit market were evident Lehman’s middle managers were 
organizing their own method of managing the firm’s leverage. Absent clear guidance from the 
executive committee, middle management seized the initiative to implement its own risk 
standards. 
In May 2007, even before it was apparent that a crisis was looming, middle managers 
were working together to establish risk limits. Without a clear global risk limit forthcoming from 
the executive committee, Rob Redmond, a senior advisor in the firm’s Global Financial Sponsor 
business, observes, “we should put some kind of a limit in place so that we can begin to manage 
what should be a scarce resource.” During the heady days of the real estate boom, Lehman’s 
executive committee had all but abandoned standardized risk limits. Now, rather than waiting for 
the executive committee to implement some kind of risk framework, middle management begins 
organizing its own risk controls. Redmond seems to recognize here that without the formal 
authority of the executive committee, establishing a limit that is respected across the bank’s 
many business units will require that any such limit be designed in consultation with each of the 
affected groups. Otherwise, there would be nothing to prevent a manager from violating this self-
imposed limit within his or her own group, as the executive committee would not enforce middle 
management’s separate risk standard. Redmond suggests that those on the email meet to discuss 
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adopting a new risk framework and proposes using a three billion dollar limit in the interim. 
Alex Kirk, a managing director of global credit products, responds by proposing they engage the 
risk management team to help them identify appropriate limits. He suggests that he and Steve 
Berkenfeld, a managing director for principal investing and private equity, meet with Lehman’s 
Chief Risk Officer before reconvening with those on the email and asks, “does that sound 
reasonable to everyone?” 









Functionally excluded from the executive committee’s formal decision-making process, middle 
management came together to take action via informally negotiated arrangements. However, this 
strategy proved far less successful when operating under the power imbalance that existed 
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between middle management and the executive committee, as what “sounds reasonable” to 
people is informed by where they are situated in the organization and their relationship to the 
firm’s organizational structures. In the first email of the chain that follows, you will notice that 
Felder is unsettled by “rumours of writedowns.” While preoccupation with market rumors was 
primarily the province of executives, middle management shared their concern in a way. Those 
in middle management were not unbothered by market rumors, they just happened to be far more 
concerned with what to do about them. Attitudes about market rumors diverged over which 
actions constituted a reasonable response. 
In February 2008, Felder hopes to use this new set of rumors as an excuse to delever the 
bank’s balance sheet, even referencing the troubled Bear Stearns when he predicts that if things 
get much worse, “it will become very difficult for us to access the market in any significant size 
on a regular basis.” Thomas Humphrey, the head of global fixed income distribution and a 
member of the executive committee, acknowledges only the portion of Felder’s first email about 
the rumor and not what should be done about it, citing a rank and file member of his team, Steve 
Pedone, who heard “the same rumour feedback.” Lowitt, at the time the Co-chief Administrative 
Officer for Finance, interjects the executive committee’s usual refrain, laying the blame for the 
firm’s ongoing difficulties with rumors and “poor press.” He then adds the vague exhortation 
that it is “hard hat time again,” suggesting that there is work to be done without specifying what 
that work entails exactly. 
Felder recognizes the opening and attempts to gently return the conversation’s focus to 
the steps that should be taken to minimize the effects of the rumors and prepare for worsening 
market conditions. He uses the rather ominous remark, “I think the market is going to get worse 
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for the next 3-6 months,” to shift the executives’ attention to the repercussions of inaction. 
Essentially, he is begging the executives to ignore the source and content of the rumors and, 
instead, concentrate on the consequences that these rumors could have on the bank’s operations. 
In his view, which is representative of those across the middle management tier, the best way to 
respond to these rumors is to ensure that Lehman is prepared to weather worsening market 
conditions. However, Felder’s appeals to preparedness fall on deaf ears. In the very next email 
Tonucci reports that PIMCO, the world’s largest mutual fund, “just called about this rumour 
also.” At this point, the conversation that Felder originally intended has gone entirely off the rails. 
Humphrey weighs taking a more “offensive” approach to addressing the rumors, asking, “what 
can we say?” and later he proposes new messaging “targeted toward the biggest holders” of 
Lehman’s debt and equity. Again, this communication would in no way alter Lehman’s capital 
structure, operating plan, or ability to withstand a further downturn. Felder must, ultimately, 
content himself with having Lehman’s large clients added to the list of people contacted as a part 
of the new “offensive” response strategy, which might, at least, help preserve existing business. 





















Although it may rightly appear that Felder is just screaming into the abyss, the exchange 
above accentuates the differences between where the executive committee and middle 
management locate Lehman’s organizational priorities. While members of the executive 
committee were quite literally asking “what can we say” in response to market rumors, middle 
management was far more inclined to wonder “what can we do” about them. Secure in the 
knowledge that their strategy had worked before, the executive committee was generally 
perception-oriented. Middle management, on the other hand, was oriented toward operational 
change. Both expected Lehman to endure the existing market turmoil, but those in middle 
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management anticipated this outcome would require action and internal adjustments. This 
immediate difference was compounded by differences in each groups’ confidence in their own 
capacity to direct change at various institutional levels. Where middle management saw the need 
to realign Lehman’s internal operations with its organizational values, executives saw an 
opportunity to use Lehman’s organizational values to redefine Wall Street’s institutional norms. 
It was as if one group wanted to change the ship’s course, while another wanted to change the 
ocean. 
The Crisis Continues and the Divide Deepens. 
The differences in these two outlooks became more pronounced as the crisis wore on, with both 
groups becoming more desperate to dominate the narrative. The executive committee and middle 
management both believed that the policies and priorities for which they advocated were the 
legitimate instantiation of Lehman’s organizational principles. Consequently, they marshalled 
the same organizational ideals to endorse conflicting courses of action. Felder’s more forceful 
appeal to members of the committee in March 2008, about one month later, provides a clear 
example of this. 
While awaiting a reply from CFO Erin Callan, Felder forwards an email expressing his 
concerns to executive committee member Bart McDade, the global head of Lehman’s Equities 
Division, noting, “I’m not sure we are set up to weather this one.” McDade’s response signals his 
objections to Felder’s petition from the very beginning, opening with a single word: 
“Leadership!” He admonishes Felder to “think positive,” adding, “perpetual optimism is a force 
multiplier.” McDade’s instructions to “keep plugging away!!!” encapsulate the thrust of his reply. 
He is directing Felder to stick to the plan and embrace the executive committee’s leadership style 
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and talking points within his own team. McDade even insinuates that Felder’s lack of resolute 
leadership might be part of the problem, interposing the question “what has your credit team 
conjured up in balance sheet and cash credit relief itself?” 
Comparing McDade’s email to Felder’s subsequent answer illuminates how both men 
could reach such wildly different conclusions when putting the same organizational beliefs into 
practice. McDade and Felder share the conviction that Lehman is exceptional, bound up in an 
entrenched and tested meritocracy. Yet, this sentiment manifests differently for both. After 
enumerating the banks that “are already lining the equity up,” Felder contends, “We need to be at 
the front of the line.” Not only does this assertion imply that Lehman should be at the front of the 
line, but that it is, in fact, capable of being at the front of the line because its exceptional 
management and history of success will enable it to jump in front of UBS, Fannie Mae, Merrill 
Lynch, and the like. Felder wants to leverage Lehman’s reputation to delever the bank’s balance 
sheet. Relatedly, McDade is so convinced of Lehman’s superiority that he is unable to entertain 
any notion of how things might be done better, especially if this requires doing so “not because it 
makes sense, but just because.” He rhetorically submits to Felder, “what else should we be doing 
that we are not doing,” intimating that they do not need to do anything else. 
Upon hitting a wall with McDade, Felder tips his hand to co-CAO Ian Lowitt in the 
hopes of achieving a better result. The outcome, however, is not much different. Like both Felder 
and McDade, Lowitt perceives Lehman Brothers as set above its Wall Street peers, declaring, “it 
will be tough, but we are more active than others.” Moreover, he agrees with Felder that 
counterparty risk will cause another bank run, but, echoing McDade, he believes that “it will be 
industry-wide, not Lehman-specific.” The subtext of Lowitt’s comment, then, is that Lehman is 
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better positioned to withstand a run on the financial sector than any of its industry competitors. 
Still, Felder takes one more shot with the plea, “Begging that people trust me. You can fire me if 
I’m wrong.” Of course, the tension between Felder and those on the executive committee is not 
the product of distrust, but is rather a consequence of parallel views on how best to enact 
Lehman’s guiding principles in practice. 













Bankruptcy: Charges of Executive Sabotage and Claims of Middle Management Innocence 
Frustrations continued to mount on both sides right up to the moment of the bankruptcy, at which 
point several middle managers were no longer able to contain their contempt for Lehman’s brass. 
On the morning of Lehman’s bankruptcy, in September 2008, Satu Parikh, the managing director 
of commodities trading, sent several emails similar to that above to the members of the executive 
committee, but only ever received a response from Mike Gelband, Lehman’s global head of 
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capital markets. Parikh’s missive is remarkable for its candor, though it was by no means unique. 
His indignation is palpable through the first paragraph, but it is not until the second that he 
clearly ascribes blame to the executive committee. In a way, the charge, “I think there needs to 
be an investigation into the broader issue of malfeasance,” is analogous to the executive 
committee’s judgment that Lehman itself cannot possibly be at fault. However, unlike the 
executive committee, which only identifies market rumors and short sellers as the culprit, middle 
management expands the list of those culpable for Lehman’s misfortunes to include the 
executive committee itself. Due to their faith in Lehman’s proven investment strategy and the 
exceptional talents of employees, the only plausible way for middle managers to account for 
Lehman’s failure is gross malfeasance at the top. Lehman’s internally esteemed exceptionalism 
precludes any inclination by either group that the firm’s practices or investment philosophy 
could be at fault. Both groups see their own actions and decisions as beyond reproach. For 
middle managers, who had been excluded from the committee’s formal decision-making process, 
this evoked an “us versus them” mentality, which Parikh articulates in the line, “We were NOT 
in this together.” For his part, Gelband apologizes without acknowledging any responsibility for 
the firm’s fading fortunes. In fact, his response only serves to reinforce Parikh’s narrative with 
the added nuance that not all executives are at fault. The claim, “I tried my best both before I got 
fired and during the 10 weeks I’ve been back,” leaves room to question whether those who fired 
him also tried their best. 
Parikh also calls attention to the physical distance that separated middle management 
from those on the executive committee, declaring, “You guys on [the thirty-first floor] 
monumentally screwed this one up.” In this way, Parikh uses the physical arrangement of 
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Lehman’s office space to reflect what he sees as the ideological distance separating the two 
groups. While these groups certainly differed in their orientation to the firm’s organizational 
priorities, the major themes pervading Lehman’s organizational culture were ubiquitous across 
the layers of the company hierarchy. However, Parikh’s use of Lehman’s floor plan to enforce an 
“us versus them” outlook enables him and others to preserve a portrait of middle management as 
blameless. 






In order for middle management to escape responsibility, someone else must be at fault. 
Displacing blame onto a small cadre of top executives allows middle management to maintain a 
view of themselves as blameless and, thus, unblemished by Lehman’s failure. This is important 
because by avoiding blame, middle managers can continue to lay claim to exceptional talents 
despite Lehman’s collapse. This persists after the bankruptcy, as illustrated below in an appeal 
from Kaushik Amin, the managing director of liquid markets. Amin, a middle manager, worries 
that employees, like himself, will not show up for work after the bankruptcy court halts their 
paychecks. Simply put, the tenor of his note is that you have to pay for talent. He is unable to 
recognize that by now the jig is up. Lehman has entered bankruptcy and employees, regardless of 
their talents and skills, are not entitled to a paycheck from a bankrupt company. Still he persists 
because middle managers did not see themselves at fault for Lehman’s undoing. They identified 
Lehman’s failure with failures at the executive level and, as such, those in middle management 
did not believe that the firm’s collapse impeached their own exceptional skill sets in any way. 
This outlook is reflected by Amin from the outset, who beginnings by insisting, “The financial 
system is very complex and requires specialized skills.” He continues by drawing a clear 
distinction between the “sophisticated” labor of Lehman employees and the blue-collar labor 
involved in pulling physical stock in a warehouse. He claims that even those with the requisite 
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financial training will be unable to unwind Lehman’s balance sheet in an orderly fashion, 
proclaiming, “Outside personnel cannot do this task in a short period of time.” Irrespective of the 
rationale, Amin is grasping for what amounts to a consolation prize. However, it is a consolation 
prize that he and other middle managers appear to feel entitled to due to what they see as their 
place among Wall Street’s elite minds. Recall Parikh’s email above, in which he claims that top 
executives “will carry that with them in all future endeavors.” It is difficult to see how those in 
middle management could possibly escape being similarly marked by this failure, as they were 
all involved in Lehman’s day-to-day operations. It is as though they believe their exclusion from 
the executive committee’s decision-making process insulates them from bearing any 
responsibility for the firm’s fate. So much so, in fact, that even after Lehman has gone bankrupt 
Amin writes an email extolling the merits of continuing to pay these employees while the 
bankruptcy is adjudicated. 






Middle managers located a mandate to act in Lehman’s organizational values and when it 
became clear that executive leadership would not implement the operational changes that middle 
managers thought the company’s cultural tenets demanded, they collaborated together to design 
and implement their own informal solutions. They centered action toward operational change in 
their own negotiated decision-making process, but struggled against the power imbalance that 
came with being excluded from executive committee decision making. Yet, it was this exclusion 
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from the nexus of formal decision-making authority that allowed middle management to cling to 
a belief in their own talents in spite of failure. Neither the executive committee nor middle 
management thought the ship was sinking, but where those on the executive committee saw a 
ship under attack, middle managers saw the ship being sabotaged. After the bankruptcy, blaming 
leadership became more pronounced among the ranks of middle managers and they made their 
feelings clear that they had not contributed to the decline and, ultimately, the demise of the 
company in any way. They still believed themselves to be exceptional and ensconced in Wall 








Relative to the sheer glut of emails authored by middle management and those on the executive 
committee, the data contain comparatively few examples of substantive correspondence between 
rank and file employees. More often than not, rank and file employees appear on emails as 
observers, simply copied to emails in which middle managers relate instructions to be carried out 
by their lower level direct reports. Instances when these lower level employees actually engage 
in meaningful exchanges with one another or their supervisors often occur with little internal 
context provided. It is entirely possible that the dearth of internal context present in exchanges 
between rank and file employees is because they were careful about what they would commit to 
writing. As such, much of the data from rank and file employees had to be contextualized by 
recreating the timeline of events along which they occur and situating these exchanges within the 
fluid relationship dynamics outlined by the rest of the data in order to uncover how the 
organizational location of junior staff shaped their interactions. Notwithstanding this challenge, 
the data present a clear and more or less cohesive picture of junior employees at Lehman 
Brothers during this period. 
The picture of Lehman’s rank and file that emerges from the data is anything but a 
collection of compliant subordinates content to unquestioningly carry out orders behind the 
scenes. Junior employees were self-confident and quietly critical and on occasion even jocular 
when discussing Lehman’s plight with peers. Like the executives and middle managers
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considered above, rank and file employees imagined that those at Lehman Brothers were capable 
of overcoming any obstacle. They found comfort in the abiding wisdom that Lehman had 
weathered worse and now possessed an unparalleled mastery of the financial markets, a legacy 
of excellence to which they also laid claim by virtue of having earned a place within the 
company’s ranks. Junior employees upheld Lehman’s cultural tenets and put their faith in their 
own exceptional skills to see them through. However, this had a different operative meaning for 
them in practice. The rank and file, especially toward the end, were less concerned with the fate 
of the firm or the value of their Lehman stock, as many did not own any. They were concerned 
with what would happen to them and they were confident that they would quickly find 
employment elsewhere. Like passengers on a sinking ship, Lehman’s junior employees believed 
it was just a matter of time until another ship came along to rescue them. 
Following the bankruptcy, Lehman’s lower tier employees knew that there would be no 
golden parachutes for them, but they were equally convinced that they would not be stained by 
the firm’s failure. They expected to escape the crisis with their own reputations and, more 
importantly, their résumés intact. In fact, the data capture more middle managers successfully 
exiting the firm in the lead up to the bankruptcy than rank and file employees even attempting to 
leave. This is not to say that junior employees shared their superiors’ optimism, especially as 
bankruptcy became more and more imminent. Indeed, the rank and file joked openly with each 
other about what they saw as maladroit attempts by executives to stave off bankruptcy. Junior 
employees believed that Lehman’s failure was a failure of management and did not reflect the 
true caliber of the rank and file. Lehman’s present shortcomings, whatever they might be, 
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certainly could not be attributed to them, though they were eager to identify with Lehman’s past 
success. 
At the same time, the data reveal an executive committee struggling to control the 
narrative and concerned that mounting criticism in the press might trigger a mass exodus among 
the rank and file, neutering the bank’s ability to both respond and carry on normal operations. In 
the independent, but related, emails that follow, Catherine Jones, the global head of 
communications, circulates a Wall Street Journal article referencing an anonymous external 
email entitled “Breaking News: Lehman To Be Acquired by Tooth Fairy,” (see Appendix B for 
the full text) much to the amusement of junior employees. A short time later Larry Wieseneck, 
co-head of securities, betrays the executive committee’s pressing concern for the attitudes of the 
rank and file, when what was supposed to be a confidential communication with the rating 
agency Moody’s somehow finds its way into the company rumor mill. 
It is not altogether clear why Jones distributes this article across the firm. There was 
speculation within Lehman Brothers that David Einhorn was the referenced email’s author or, at 
least, was in some way behind it and, in fact, the missive even mentions him approvingly, 
describing him facetiously as “mean, evil, bad short-seller David Einhorn.” Therefore, it is 
possible that Jones circulates the piece hoping to get out in front of the story, or even as an 
attempt to stoke resentment of Einhorn within the firm’s rank and file. In any event, the 
lighthearted reaction she elicits from Peter Keavey, a senior vice president in the fixed income 
division, would not have been her aim. 
Several weeks later, Larry Wieseneck divulges the executive committee’s genuine 
concern about the clamoring of those on the lower floors. His email begins with a recounting of a 
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recent conversation with Moody’s analysts in which he was involved. By this point, Lehman had 
already suffered one Moody’s downgrade, yet Wieseneck exhibits little concern about the 
prospect of another or even what should be the more startling revelation that “there is no amount 
of capital we could raise in the markets that would make them comfortable.” Instead, he reserves 
his concern for the reactions of junior employees on floors two through five, where “people are 
asking questions.” Confronted with a rating agency’s grave doubts regarding the continued 
viability of an independent Lehman Brothers, doubts that invoke the ill-fated Bear Stearns no 
less, Wieseneck seems more troubled that somehow this news “is now all over the 4th floor.” 









What Lehman’s leadership failed to realize was that the rank and file simply did not see 
their fate tied to that of Lehman Brothers in quite the same way. What is more, this was nothing 
new and had, by and large, been the case for at least a year. Toward the end of 2007, after 
Lehman’s ballooning balance sheet had exposed the potential dangers of the firm’s Repo 105 
accounting practice, a junior employee and his middle management supervisor exploit their 
mutual recognition of the potential hazards that this poses to share a moment of levity with one 
another. 
Repo 105 is an accounting maneuver, whereby a short-term over-collateralized 
repurchase agreement is classified as a constructive sale. Lehman used Repo 105 transactions to 
make it appear as though they had less debt than they actually did when it came time for them to 
publicly report earnings. The process would begin with Lehman identifying another financial 
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firm that had excess cash reserves to lend out. This other financial firm is termed the 
“counterparty.” Lehman would then “sell” assets, generally government bonds, to the 
counterparty in exchange for their cash value. At the same time, Lehman would agree to 
repurchase these same assets from the counterparty soon after, usually only a day or two, at 
105% of their cash value, hence the name Repo 105. In the interim, Lehman would use the cash 
from the “sale” to pay down its debt right before publicly releasing its required financial 
disclosures. Once its disclosures were published, Lehman would resume its debt and repurchase 
its assets from the counterparty at the 105% premium. In reality, the assets “sold” rarely changed 
hands because the period between the sale and buy-back was so short, but the well-timed process 
allowed Lehman Brothers to temporarily conceal sizable losses from its balance sheet. This was 
all legal. 
Repeated use of Repo 105 as a balance sheet cosmetic comes with tremendous risks, not 
the least of which is the need to regularly find counterparties willing to essentially lend out their 
cash reserves. The need for additional counterparties precipitates the exchange below, as, having 
already recorded $10.5 billion of Repo 105 agreements, Mitchell King, the managing director of 
rates trading, reports that he is still trying to “get another 700 million out.” Management’s 
continued reliance on Repo 105 to superficially strengthen the firm’s balance sheet around 
reporting time was a mark of hubris and, indeed, Lehman was the only major firm employing 
this gimmick during the Financial Crisis. Neither tier of management could even fathom the 
possibility of prospective counterparties disappearing. It was utterly unthinkable that companies 
would not jump at the chance to lend to the mighty Lehman, which might explain why, when 
asked “Can you imagine what this would be like without 105?” King responds by joking, “it 
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would be even more worser.” Unfazed, Jerry Rizzieri, a vice president and senior banker among 
the rank and file in the firm’s fixed income division, joins in the joke, adding, “In fact, it might 
even be the most worstest.” 
The reasons behind Rizzieri’s flippancy, however, are different. He does not appear 
apathetic about the chances of Repo 105 counterparties suddenly retreating. Recall that before 
his supervisor responds comically, Rizzieri earnestly calls attention to the prospective peril of 
being forced to perform their work “without 105.” Still, he is comfortable enough to joke about 
the dangers posed. Like other members of the rank and file, Rizzieri likely had faith in the 
judgment and skill of his superiors and even if, in the end, things turned out poorly, his time at 
Lehman would serve as valuable experience. Unlike the company men higher up, who “bled 
Lehman green” and could not imagine a world without Lehman Brothers, junior employees did 
not define themselves through their commitment to the corporate entity that was Lehman.  











Even though rank and file employees did not outwardly share the same allegiance as their 
organizational superiors to the material trappings of the corporation, their identity was, 
nevertheless, tied up in the cultural understandings of Lehman Brothers. Lehman’s 
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organizational culture had meaning for the rank and file beyond the bounds of the bank’s four 
walls. They would always be “Lehman investment bankers.” They just might not always be 
investment bankers at Lehman Brothers. 
This became abundantly clear after the bankruptcy, as junior employees continued with 
“business as usual,” confident that they would not be blamed for the firm’s misfortunes and so 
allowed to keep their jobs even as the bankruptcy court prepared to sell off Lehman’s business 
units piecemeal. In the exchange below, Paul Gregg, a vice president of global commodities 
trading, asks his peer Peter Keavey, a senior vice president, if he has heard anything about the 
rumors that Barclays Capital (“Barcap”) plans to acquire Lehman’s investment banking business 
out of bankruptcy. Imparting that both he and Keavey would be included in the rumored deal, he 
says, “the Barcap thing looked good.” 
Gregg’s parenthetical addition, “that’s us,” is almost assuredly unnecessary. Peter 
Keavey knows where he works. Its inclusion serves only to convey a near childlike giddiness 
that prevailing rumors hold that their jobs are out of jeopardy. This singular remark encapsulates 
Gregg’s trepidation about what will happen next as well as his conviction that the outcome will 
be favorable for them whatever the case. It is also worth noting that this exchange takes place 
just one day after Lehman filed for bankruptcy protection, so Keavey’s “diplomatic reply,” “Is 
there anything to tell?” is remarkably suitable. The notion that anything substantive had been 
decided so soon, much less which, if any, junior employees would be retained, should have been 
implausible. Yet, Gregg reports, “the Barcap thing looked good.” And while it may have looked 
good for lower level employees, like Keavey and Gregg, for Lehman Brothers things could not 
have looked bleaker the day after its bankruptcy. 
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As time passed following the bankruptcy, junior employees increasingly 
compartmentalized the business entity Lehman Brothers and the culture of Lehman. Even after 
the firm failed, their own self-confidence endured. They divorced the firm’s fate from the firm’s 
culture and continued to embody the resilience, excellence, and exceptionalism that they felt 
existed at Lehman. This explains why, even after the firm failed, the cultural outlook of former 
employees in the rank and file persisted unchanged. 
John Palchynsky, a junior employee in the collateral allocation group, reports JPMorgan 
Chase is pilfering Lehman’s Depository Trust account through the extrajudicial reallocation of 
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Lehman’s pledged collateral securities from a custodial account into Chase’s own corporate 
account. Lehman Brothers’ Treasurer, Paolo Tonucci, responds by asking, “Why are they doing 
this?” A mere thirteen minutes later Palchynsky essentially replies, “I don’t know.” Rather than 
find a more definitive answer to an executive committee member’s question, Palchynsky offers 
his best guess and then follows it up with, “see you all at Barcap.” JPMorgan surreptitiously 
looting Lehman’s collateral is a problem for Lehman Brothers, not Barclays, and Palchynsky, 
who seemed to already be thinking of himself as a Barclays employee, simply could not be 
bothered with this problem. Yet, Palchynsky’s perspective is recklessly early, as Barclays would 
not finalize the deal to acquire the remnants of Lehman Brothers until three days later on 
September 22nd. Barclays had, by this point, confirmed many of the rumors and announced its 
interest in acquiring Lehman’s investment operation. However, any deal would still need to 
receive all kinds of approval from both sides of the Atlantic, including approval from the U.S. 
Federal Reserve, the British Financial Services Authority, the Chancellor of the Exchequer, and a 
bankruptcy court judge. On September 19th this remained far from a done deal. Nevertheless, 
Palchynsky is convinced he will soon be a Barclays employee. Even after Lehman’s failure, he 
remains confident that his skill set will be enough to save him and his career, just as the 
exceptional skills of employees had saved Lehman in the past. He comments, “It has been one 
hell of a week, challenging, but exhilarating too,” suggesting that the work of dealing with the 











It is as if Palchynsky sees the bankruptcy as an opportunity to ply his skills and a chance 
to accumulate valuable experience. In so doing, he ignores the exigencies of his present 
circumstances in favor of imagining the more pleasant potentialities that he believes his 
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professional qualities will eventually occasion. Thus, he assumes he will shortly become a 
Barcap employee, but only because he continues to think like a Lehman employee. 
The data contain only a single example of a rank and file employee attempting to leave 
Lehman Brothers before the bankruptcy. Taken together, the emails below are instructive as a 
negative case depicting a junior employee deciding to abandon the firm. James Macintosh, a vice 
president of carbon trading, asks his middle management supervisor Max Coreth, a managing 
director of commodities trading, if he can spend the second week of September (i.e. 9/8-9/12) 
visiting the coal team in Denver and attend a trade group conference there. While the data do not 
contain Coreth’s response, the second email establishes Macintosh’s true motivation for making 
the trip to Denver. In the second email, sent the Monday morning following his trip (i.e. 9/15), 
Macintosh reconnects with Robert Forgrave, the global head of commodities for rival investment 
bank CIBC, to solicit employment with Lehman’s competitor. The aide-memoire “we met this 
past winter to discuss potential carbon trading roles at CIBC World Markets” reveals that 
Macintosh’s trip to Denver was not only a premeditated attempt to leave Lehman Brothers, but 
also that it was not his first. Macintosh later explains his desire to leave Lehman, noting, “Now 
that I am (very likely) on the market I wanted to reconnect.” It is not clear from either exchange 
when exactly Macintosh lost his faith in Lehman Brothers, but his emails leave little doubt that 
he did not share his peers’ attitude that rank and file employees could just wait around to be 















































This negative case reflects many of the fundamental differences central to the hierarchical 
divisions at Lehman Brothers. Middle management operationalized Lehman’s values by 
pursuing concrete action to the extent they were able, while those on the executive committee 
unflinchingly adhered to strategies that had proven successful in the past for the very same 
reason. Where middle managers saw executive inaction or operational negligence, executives 
saw strategic and steadfast resolve. Where executives saw panicking middle managers 
overreacting, middle management saw sensible measures and overdue changes. Both used the 
same cultural tenets to justify their conflicting approaches. The negative case above appears to 
be a microcosm of this same conflict within the rank and file. Most junior employees believe that, 
like passengers on a sinking ship, it is only a matter of time until they are rescued. They expect 
other investment banks to recognize that their skills and experience are far too valuable to be lost 
when Lehman fails, so they are content to wait for the next opportunity to come along. On the 
other hand, though Macintosh likewise believes his skills are highly prized, recounting as much 
in his email to Forgrave, he goes searching for a lifeboat. Like the middle managers, who 
discovered in Lehman’s organizational principles an injunction to act to save the firm, Macintosh 
concludes that it is incumbent upon him to act to save himself, as he proactively ventures to 
abandon ship. 
Importantly, both Macintosh’s decision to attempt to leave and others’ decision to 
patiently remain, just like the larger managerial decisions toward inaction or change, were 
agentive and contemplative. While these actions were informed by the structure of organizational 
hierarchies and institutional histories, there were undertaken by people interacting with one 
another to situate the meanings of events within shifting organizational contingencies during a 
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period of crisis. Decisions made throughout Lehman Brothers represent different instantiations of 
the same cultural principles. Each decision, exchange, and interaction is illustrative of differently 
positioned groups enacting the same organizational culture toward different organizational 
priorities based on the exigencies apparent at different organizational locations. As such, 
Lehman’s organizational crisis did not lead to cultural disintegration, but rather engendered a 
shared cultural zeal, which complicated decision making when different groups used it to justify 









The failure of Lehman Brothers is a compelling case of cultural survival despite 
organizational demise because it is an instance of complete organizational collapse that 
nevertheless accommodates social scientific inquiry by preserving a record of employee 
interactions. Though the permanent failure of the organization renders traditional ethnographic 
methods unavailable, Lehman’s email records remain preserved as cultural artifacts. These 
records of employee interaction enable the organization’s history, practices, and negotiated order 
to be recreated and observed. The foregoing chapters piece together surviving email exchanges 
to provide a picture of Lehman Brothers during its final months and demonstrate how employees 
across the organization’s hierarchy sustained and amplified Lehman’s organizational culture in 
different ways as the crisis deepened. 
The company’s organizational culture was grounded in the extra-local free market logics 
concerning meritocracy, the significance of talent, and the virtues of competition that are 
institutionalized in the American financial sector more broadly. Institutionalized assumptions 
about talent and competition were ensconced in executive committee accounts of the firm’s prior 
triumphs. Executives located these institutional logics in every one of Lehman’s previous 
successes, crediting the firm’s counter-cyclical growth strategy with the company’s rapid 
expansion during the decade before the bankruptcy. The counter-cyclical growth strategy itself 
was an expression of the perceived talent and expertise embodied by Lehman executives. They
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believed that they had devised a way to repeatedly outsmart and outcompete Wall Street’s other 
investment banks and pointed to the gifted workforce who concocted and skillfully executed this 
strategy to explain their enormous and sustained success. They held out their experiences during 
the dot-com bubble and Russian Financial Crisis as proof of this. When members of the 
executive committee proclaim, “Will and skill always win,” or demand, “No blinking,” they are 
instantiating the institutional logics of talent and competition that are bound up in the firm’s 
counter-cyclical growth strategy to justify organizational inaction and avoid the past 
overreactions of their competitors by simply “staying the course.” 
Middle management’s desire to issue new equity hinged on the same institutionalized 
assumptions about talent and competition. Unlike executive committee members, however, they 
did not believe that success through counter-cyclical growth was self-actualizing or could be 
achieved through inaction. While they were resolved that they possessed “very specialized 
skills” that enabled them “to understand sophisticated financial systems,” this amounted to 
naught if the executive committee hindered their ability to exercise these talents and take 
advantage of their competitive edge. This plays out most clearly, perhaps, when Felder argues, 
“Lehman needs to be at the front of the line [to raise fresh equity].” Felder, as well as the 
executives with whom he corresponds, maintains that Lehman’s history of success makes it the 
best bank on the Street. They are all convinced that Lehman is superior to UBS, Washington 
Mutual, Fannie Mae, Freddie Mac, Merrill Lynch, etc. As such, they do not anticipate 
encountering any difficulty cutting in front of their competitors in the line to raise equity. The 
executives, however, do not believe there is a need to race against inferior banks, while Felder is 
of the opinion that the ability to outcompete others does not matter if you refuse to participate in 
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the competition altogether. After the bankruptcy, middle management expresses resentment over 
being hamstrung in their attempts to save the bank by the executive committee. They feel the 
firm’s executives had betrayed the meritocracy on which Lehman was built, ultimately declaring 
that they “were NOT in this together.” 
Rank and file employees were able to disentangle their personal identities from the 
failure of Lehman Brothers more quickly and completely than either of the groups above them. 
Though Lehman’s junior employees were far less concerned with the fate of the firm than their 
organizational superiors, they turned to the same institutional logics when constructing their 
place in the labor market both before and after the bankruptcy. Rather than use prevailing ideas 
about talent and competition to decipher what Lehman should do to address its woes, junior 
employees adapted these assumptions to inform their own personal responses to the crisis. 
Members of the rank and file were engrossed in unraveling how the logics of competition would 
manifest in the labor market and affect their employment prospects. At the same time, however, 
they were convinced that they had, at least individually, been “successful at Lehman” and 
“possessed expertise” that would be recognized and valued by other prospective employers. 
They upheld Lehman’s shared culture of exceptionalism and anticipated that time spent at 
Lehman Brothers would serve as sufficient signal of their talents and mastery of financial 
skillsets by virtue of simply having secured such prestigious employment with what was once a 
well-regarded Wall Street titan. 
Throughout the course of Lehman’s downfall, its organizational culture galvanized 
different hierarchical groups to condemn the perceived faults and flawed decisions of other 
groups, both internal and external, while enabling each of these groups to avoid accepting any of 
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the blame themselves. Importantly, however, each group was consistently oriented to the 
collective problem of Lehman’s deteriorating financial position and embraced the same 
institutional logics in their proposals for addressing the crisis. Disagreements seldom arose when 
determining “what do these logics mean,” but instead emerged as disputes over “what do these 
logics mean we should do.” We can now revisit the organizational failure typology introduced in 
Chapter One. 
Previous studies of organizational failure demonstrate how organizations can fail, in 
whole or in part, and outline the relationship between organizational failure and the failure of 
organizational cultures. Reviewing what can happen to an organization’s culture under instances 
of temporary and total organizational failures foregrounds the virtues of these classifications and 
clarifies this study’s contribution to the organization studies literature. Standard business school 
case studies, like Kotter and Heskett’s (1992) classic evaluation of Nissan, envision a top-down 
leadership-driven sort of culture change in which management identifies operational deficiencies 
and implements new norms of conduct and ways of thinking to overcome the challenge. 
Occasionally, however, organizational crises bring about group role disintegration and complete 
cultural collapse, as in the case of the Mann Gulch Fire (Weick 1993), while in other instances 
organizational crises inflame cultural schisms that reveal or precipitate multiple idiocultures, as 
in the case of the Plainfield Tornado (Fine and Hallett 2014) or Arthur Andersen (Hallett 2003). 
Vaughan (1996) even demonstrates how an organizational culture can endure a momentary, 
albeit tragic, organizational failure, leaving the organization vulnerable to similar occurrences.  
However, little attention has been directed toward understanding how organizational culture can 
survive the complete and total failure of an organization. This study, quite literally, fills this gap 
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Figure 30. Organizational Failures and Organizational Cultural Outcomes Revisited 
  
Temporary organizational 





Total organizational failure and 
organization dissolution  
 
Cultural   
failure 
Organizational crisis during which 
new beliefs and values emerge, 
while old ones are abandoned 
 
this is the province of traditional 
business school cases that see 
culture as an avenue to drive 
change and overcome industry or 
operational problems. 
(see Kotter and Heskett 1992) 
Collapse of sensemaking; 
Group disintegration; 
Breakdown of people doing things 
together 
 
Complete cultural disintegration 
 





Crisis causes or reveals generative 
dissonance between groups and the 
organization fractures into factions 
differentiated by idiocultures, but 
survives despite these divisions 
 
Existing culture splinters into 
multiple idiocultures 
 
Plainfield Tornado  (Fine and 
Hallett 2014) 
Discrete groups characterized by 
distinct idiocultures compete for 
organizational control; No single 
group is able to overcome crisis on 
its own 
 
Existing culture splinters as 
organization collapses 
 





Organizational crisis attributed to 
“operator error” or “isolated 
misconduct”; 
Leaders blamed, fired, and 
replaced; High risk of recurrence 
 
Challenger Launch Disaster 
(Vaughan 1996) 
Culture is a source of both group 
cohesion and confusion during 
organizational crisis;  “Group 
think” intensifies cultural zeal as 
the organization implodes; Staff 
preserve existing meanings 
 
Lehman Brothers Bankruptcy 
	  
in the literature and completes the typology in Figure 30 by demonstrating that though Lehman 
employees disagreed about how to solve the organization’s problems, they remained similarly 
oriented to the crisis. Lehman’s organizational culture served as a source of cohesion that 
provided employees with a common frame of reference for understanding the crisis, but also 
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provoked confusion as conflicts, driven by employees’ different organizational positions, 
emerged over how best to respond. 
Despite the organization’s failure, Lehman Brothers’ culture never waned. It did not 
deteriorate or disintegrate, nor did it fracture into rival idiocultures with competing meanings 
systems and paradigms. Each of the company’s hierarchical groups developed slightly different 
proposals for dealing with the crisis and leveraged their recommendations to ascribe blame to 
other groups after the organization ultimately collapsed, but each of these proposals rested on the 
same shared cultural orientation. None of the hierarchical groups ever abandoned the core tenets 
of meritocracy and exceptionalism. They simply manifested them in different ways and 
mobilized them toward distinct organizational priorities. Each group felt as though they had done 
exactly what they were supposed to do and so were unable to entertain the notion that they might 
have acted any differently. Even after the organization’s failure, the organization’s culture 
endured, which, perhaps, not only demonstrates the durability of Lehman’s culture, but also the 
durability of the privilege of elite groups. Former Lehman Brothers employees fully expected 
and, indeed, felt entitled to retain the social status and economic privilege they felt their talents 
merited and, in fact, most all of them did. 
Jerry Rizzieri was made a managing director when Barclays acquired Lehman out of 
bankruptcy and since 2016 he has been head of Mizuho Securities, the U.S. investment-banking 
subsidiary of Japan-based Mizuho Financial Group. Paul Gregg was recently named Chief 
Operating Officer and Chief Financial Officer of Rock Elm Capital, a private equity firm in 
Connecticut. Peter Keavey is the Director of Crude and Refined Energy Products for the Chicago 
Mercantile Exchange (CME Group), where he is responsible for risk management and ensuring 
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stability in the oil and gas markets. John Palchynsky did, indeed, end up at Barclays Capital, just 
as he predicted, and James Macintosh followed his supervisor, Max Coreth, into the energy 
sector, where they work for Sempra Energy. 
Lehman’s former middle managers fared equally well. Kaushik Amin, who argued, “The 
financial system is very complex and requires specialized skills,” was rewarded for his own 
specialized skills when he was tapped to head Royal Bank Scotland’s (RBS) commodities 
division shortly after the bankruptcy. In the May 2009 press release announcing Amin’s hiring, 
RBS CFO Mark Snell declared, “Kaushik’s experience running international businesses in varied 
market conditions will contribute greatly to the continued success of the firm. We look forward 
to him joining our management team.”1  Amin’s time at Lehman Brothers during the firm’s 
failure, rather than being a liability, appears to have been among the primary reasons for his 
hiring. Satu Parikh, who confronted members of the executive committee via email on the 
morning of the bankruptcy, was also hired by RBS before moving on to Harvard Management 
Company to serve as the Natural Resources portfolio manager for the university’s endowment 
fund. Ken Umezaki, the author of the first email shared in this paper, now works for a digital 
music streaming company, of which he is a chief investor. 
Even Lehman’s executives, who were the most visible during the firm’s downfall, have 
been successful since the bankruptcy. Barclays Capital paid former Lehman CFO Ian Lowitt a 
$4.5 million retention bonus for assisting with the post-bankruptcy merger. Barclays also hired 
Paolo Tonucci. JPMorgan Chase quickly snatched up Beth Rudofker, citing her well-established 
relationships with federal regulators. Following the bankruptcy, Ed Grieb left the financial sector 
and now works for the Roman Catholic Diocese of Rockville Centre on Long Island. Thomas 
																																								 																				
1 Ward, Peter. 2009. “RBS Sempra Commodities Hires Kaushik Amin as CEO,” BusinessWire, May 5. 
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Humphrey joined the hedge fund GoldenTree, which “manages alternative and non-traditional 
asset strategies for sophisticated institutional investors with high risk appetites” (i.e. short-
selling). Bart McDade founded the hedge fund River Birch Capital, which subsequently failed in 
December 2018 just over ten years after Lehman’s failure. Erin Callan retired at age 45 and lives 
in The Hamptons. 
As for Eric Felder, he was finally appointed to Lehman’s executive committee on 
September 7th, 2008, barely a week before the bankruptcy. After acquiring Lehman Brothers, 
Barclays finalized a $41 million retention deal with Felder to ensure he would stay. 
It seems CEO Dick Fuld is the only former Lehman executive to struggle to find 
employment following the firm’s collapse. Since the bankruptcy, Fuld has bounced from project 
to project, unable to escape bearing the responsibility for Lehman’s failure. Like Nissan’s former 
CEO, Takashi Ishihara, and the Space Shuttle Challenger project managers, Larry Mulloy and 
Stanley Reinartz, Fuld was sacrificed to the politics of blame. Wall Street and the public at large 
needed a villain. Congress wanted to know who was responsible. Fuld became the scapegoat: the 
captain of the sunken ship and the face of Lehman’s failure. Fuld, like NASA’s project managers 
and Nissan’s Ishihara, was unable to shake the negative associations that came with being the 
figurehead of a failed organization.  
Employees at all levels of Lehman Brothers creatively enacted local manifestations of the 
institutional logics that structure the wider field of American finance. Therefore, their decision-
making processes, interactions, and practices, while distinct to Lehman Brothers, were at least 
somewhat familiar to those in other organizations. This is likely the reason that so many of them 
quickly found similar employment with other organizations in the field despite the failure of 
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Lehman Brothers as an organization.2 Yet, the other organizations that occupy that field still 
needed to explain what happened to Lehman Brothers before they could move forward with 
business as usual. In Dick Fuld, they found their explanation. Locating the immediate cause of 
Lehman’s failure in a single powerful decision maker made the remedy easily apparent. The 
individual responsible had to be fired, reassigned, forced into retirement, or, in Fuld’s case, 
ostracized. It seems the industry attached to Fuld all of the faults contributing to the 
organization’s final negative outcome. 
Whether or not Fuld, or anyone else, could have taken action to prevent the 
organization’s failure is not particularly pertinent here precisely because Lehman’s bankruptcy 
was so unexpected. Unlike the downfall of the more cavalier Bear Stearns, whose employees had 
earned a reputation for being Wall Street “cowboys,” Lehman Brothers’ bankruptcy came as a 
surprise to many, as the company had been seen as a relatively safe bet until its waning months. 
As late as February 2008, executives and some senior personnel were still putting billions of 
dollars of their own money into Lehman Brothers preferred shares.3 Lehman Brothers was the 
only major investment bank to formally declare bankruptcy during the 2007-2008 Financial 
Crisis, but its failure is only seen as exceptional in retrospect. Had Lehman failed six months 
earlier, policymakers from that period suggest that the bank would have been offered the same 
government-underwritten rescue that Bear Stearns received at the time.4 Had Lehman failed two 
months later, it is likely that the bank would have been fully bailed out like Citigroup, which 
																																								 																				
2 The author is grateful to the members of his dissertation committee for their help formulating and articulating this 
point, as well as a great many others along the way. 
3 Smith, Randall, Susanne Craig, and Annelena Lobb. 2008. “The Lehman Stock Slide Hits Home: Employees Face 
$10 Billion in Losses.” Wall Street Journal. September 12. 




remains the sole example of bank nationalization in United States history.5 At the time of its 
bankruptcy, Lehman was not stained by a bad reputation, so the big surprise is counterfactual. 
Moreover, Lehman employees at all levels of the organizational hierarchy never considered the 
bank “too big to fail.” That terminology only emerged in response to subsequent Wall Street 
bailouts. In fact, employees were unable to envision the firm’s failure. They didn’t even talk 
about the possibility of a Bear Stearns-like buyout. Analytically, Lehman Brothers is a case of 
“absence” and that absence proves to be the crux of the case. 
It seems Dick Fuld was right to observe, “the real success for Lehman Brothers in my 
view, and the key differentiator, was our culture.” Yet, it was this culture that paralyzed the 
organization with its unpredictability. Lehman employees could not address organizational 
contingencies that they were unable to acknowledge existed. Employees at all levels and 
locations of the organization were ensnarled in the contentious and, at times, confounding 
cultural work of defining the appropriate course of action as the crisis developed, often over the 
vocal objections and disagreement of those at other levels and locations. Lehman’s failure 
occasioned intensified cultural zeal, as the organization itself imploded. However, even after 
Lehman’s demise its culture of exceptionalism and meritocracy survived in former employees’ 
explanations of the failure, which they embraced, defended, and carried forward as they 
dispersed to new organizational settings. With so many former Lehman Brothers employees now 
scattered across different industries6, the questions to which social scientists should turn their 
attention are where, how, and in what unexpected and adaptive ways will Lehman’s extant  
																																								 																				
5 Bowers, Simon and Graeme Wearden. 2009. “US taxpayers could end up owning 40% of Citigroup,” The 
Guardian, February 23. 
6 Moulds, Josephine. 2009. “Lehman Collapse: What staff did after the bubble burst,” The Telegraph, September 13. 
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organizational culture emerge next? 
The company’s organizational culture was replete with local manifestations of the extra-
local free market logics concerning meritocracy, the significance of talent, and the virtues of 
competition that are institutionalized in the American financial sector more broadly. The process 
through which these extra-local elements became endogenous to Lehman’s organizational 
culture distributed the power to act on these meanings across the organizational hierarchy. Local 
instantiations of free market logics within Lehman Brothers imbued those logics with distinct 
force and meaning, which Lehman’s hierarchical groups sought to harness in order to justify 
particular courses of organizational action. However, the instantiation of a specific logic, or sets 
of logics, by one group did not preclude the refashioning and reinterpretation of the same logic 
by another.      
Contrary to the claims of most business school case studies on corporate culture, 
management cannot dictate culture from the top-down because culture does not “move” in just 
one direction, nor does it operate the same way in all parts of an organization. Culture is at once 
established and spontaneous. Executives cannot direct it because culture emerges and is 
reproduced dynamically as people do things together. There was clear organizational consensus 
at Lehman Brothers about which logics mattered, but not how they mattered. This led to cultural 
uncertainty regarding which actions were necessary to save the bank because the power to 
formulate and deploy meanings in support of particular actions was diffused throughout the 
organization. 
This work has shown that organizational culture is more resilient than previously thought 
and is not only capable of persisting through periods of organizational crisis and turmoil, but, 
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under certain institutional circumstances, organizational culture can even survive the complete 
collapse of organizations. By centering organizationally situated interactions between employees 
at the meso-level, the author has demonstrated how macro-level institutional logics can serve as 
both a source of cultural cohesion and a point of confusion, as employees occupying disparate 
positions across an organization embrace them, combine them, challenge them, and adapt them 
in different ways to meet their often conflicting needs. The power to act on meanings and, 
importantly, the power to leverage meanings to legitimize action is dispersed throughout an 
organization, making organizational culture more ambiguous and unpredictable than traditional 
business school case studies, which envision culture as an instrument of organizational 





























Lehman To Be Acquired by Tooth Fairy 
 
The market responded with enthusiasm to reports that the Tooth Fairy has agreed to acquire 
Lehman. The purchase price has not yet been determined and will be set by Dick Fuld wishing 
upon a star, clicking his heels three times, and being transported back to that magical place 
where Lehman still sells for over $70 per share. 
 
In related news, Lehman has agreed to sell all of its level III capital, including CDOs, ABSs,   
pet rocks, baseball cards, slightly used condoms, and credit default swaps written by MBIA    
and Ambac. Lehman’s level III capital will be acquired for 150% of its face value by Tinkerbell, 
who will carry it off to Neverland to be fed to a crocodile. 
 
Lehman is financing 90% of the acquisition at an interest rate that has not been announced; 
Tinkerbell’s up-front payment consists of a handful of pixie dust, three crickets, and a bullfrog. 
 
Analyst Dick Bove estimates that the bullfrog could eventually be transformed into three   
princes and a pumpkin coach. The deal gives Lehman no recourse to any of Tinkerbell’s assets 
other than the Level III capital. If Tinkerbell defaults, Lehman’s successor entity will stick its 
hand down the crocodile’s throat and attempt to get it to regurgitate. The firm’s historical    
value-at-risk analysis shows that sticking your hand down a crocodile’s throat is completely  
safe. 
 
Treasury Secretary Hank Paulson issued a statement: “I am delighted that SWFs (Sovereign 
Wealth Fairies) continue to express confidence in the terrific values represented by American 
financial institutions. As I have been saying since August of 2007, this shows that the crisis is 
now over.” 
 
Meanwhile, the SEC has announced an investigation of mean, evil, bad short-seller David 
Einhorn. While out for a beer with a friend, Einhorn reportedly suggested that the Tooth Fairy 
does not exist and that wishing upon a star is not a wholly reliable price discovery      
mechanism. Christopher Cox, chairman of the SEC, said, “Vicious rumors attacking the Tooth 
Fairy will not be tolerated. Our entire financial system and indeed the American way of life 
depend on the Tooth Fairy and wishing upon a star. How else could one value level III capital 
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